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1 Introduction
As recent decisions make clear, the Supreme Court is reorienting the
doctrines that enforce the limits of federalism on the regulatory power of
Congress. The purpose of this undertaking is to tighten those limits in a way
that is true to our constitutional design. This project has a long history, one
that stretches to the foundational era of constitutional law.1 It is a history that
counsels considerable caution.
*
Geoffrey C. Bible & Murray R. Bring Professor of Constitutional Law, Tulane Law
School.
1. See generallyI Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question ofConstitutionalLaw,79 VA.
L. REV. 633 (1993) (describing Court's recent adoption of stricter federalism principles). The
intellectual history of American federalism, of course, probes far more deeply. See also

SAMUELH.BEERToMAKEANATION: THEREDIsCOVERYOFA1MERANFEDERAUSM31-214

(1993) (expounding evolution of democratic governmenttheory in Western Civilization).
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In its foundational decisions, the Marshall Court constructed a framework
for evaluating congressional action that created interplay between formal2 and

functional3 understandings of how federalism limits national power.4 As the
nation entered the modern, industrial age, and Congress initiated a regulatory
2. By "formal," I do not intend any pejorative implication. I simply mean any interpretive methodology grounded on decision making by rule. See P.S. ATYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FoRM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2 (1987) (differentiating between
formal reasoning and substantive reasoning); Frederick Schauer, Fonnalism, 97 YALE L.L 509,
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decision making according to rule."). In constitutional interpretation, formal methods
typically look for meaning in the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters. See Cass
R. Sunstein, ChangingConceptions ofAdministration, 1987 BYU L. REV. 927, 944 (1987)
(describing how opponents of independent agencies utilize formalist views). In its most pejorative meaning, formalism suggests an approach to legal reasoning that treats law as a closed,
complete system of objectively determinable rules that yield correct outcomes through a
noncontroversial process of deductive reasoning. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REAsoNING
AND POLrr CAL CONFU CT 24 (1996) ("The vice of formalism is found whenever people in law
falsey deny that they are making political and moral judgments."); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1983) (outlining "possible goals of legal systems").
This pejorative meaning is best taken as a warning that formalist claims become increasingly
susceptible to charges of conceptualism and mechanical jurisprudence as they move away from
their core appeal to decision making based on rules that themselves are defensible. See ATIYAH
& SUMMERS, supra,at 28-30 (distinguishing formalistic reasoning from formal reasoning).
3. As Felix Cohen recognized many years ago, the term "functional" is capable of many
meanings and connotations when applied to legal method. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach,35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 821-22 (1935) (explaining
numerous perceptions of "functionalist approach"). This much can be said with certainty:
functional method characteristically is pragmatic and deeply skeptical of the formalist prescription that judges decide cases by reasoning deductively from rules previously laid down. Id.; see
alsoBENAmINN. CARDOZO,THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESs 98-105 (1921)(commenting on evolution of functionalism in America); Alexander T. Alienikoft ConstitutionalLaw in
theAge ofBalancing,96 YALEL.J. 943,955-58 (1987) (describing development of "pragmatism"
in legal reasoning).
In the sense in which I use the term here, "function" has much the same meaning as it did
for Aristotle. To Aristotle, a thing's function (ergon) was its essence, that which defined it, as
well as its end or goal (telos). C.D.C. REEVE, PRAcriCES OF REASON: ARIsTOTiE's NicoMCHF, EM7HCS 123 (1995). Thus, by functional argument, I mean primarily the teleological
reasoning that is characteristic of Aristotle's thought Teleological reasoning seeks to explain
something by focusing on what the thing is for, its end or goal or purpose, its telos. See Stephen
Everson, Introduction to Aristotle, THE POLITICS, at xviii, xx (Stephen Everson ed., 1988)
(explaining Aristotelian perception of "social and political association"). Thus, teleological
reasoning is distinctively purposive, as is functional legal reasoning, as I understand the term.
As described by Justice Cardozo, "We are thinking ofthe end which the law serves, and fitting
its rules to the task of service." CARDOZO, supra,at 102. As an approach to resolving issues of
constitutional structure, functionalism includes an instrumentalist assessment of the anticipated
effects of the governmental action in question and minimizes the significance of legal categories.
See Thomas Sargentich, The ContemporaryDebateAboutLegislative-ExecutiveSeparationof
Powers,72 CORNEILL.REV. 430,439 (1987) (explaining thatfunctionalist approach to doctrinal
analysis entails focusing on "actual operation and values" rather than focusing on "definition").
4. See infra Part IA (discussing "The Federalist Balance in the Marshall Court").
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response to the resultant problems and dislocations caused by that transition,
a determined Court resorted to a thoroughgoing formalism in an effort to
confine national power within narrow terrain.' Beginning in 1937, in the
crucible of the Great Depression, the Court relented, replacing the earlier
formalism with a thoroughly functional understanding of congressional power
that was acquiescent to legislative prerogative.6
It is this post-1937 settlement that the contemporary Court is examining
and changing. Discontented with the failure of the functional post-1937
doctrine to register meaningful federalism limits on congressional power, the
Court has begun to reintroduce formalist elements into its approach. This
process is in an early, experimental stage, and a stable judicial consensus has
yet to take hold. It is not yet clear whether the revival of formalism in federalism jurisprudence will restore a balance that has been absent since the founding era, or simply will initiate another formalist cycle.'
Before the Court completes its experiment, I suggest the justices pause
and consider a lesson from their recent decision making with respect to the
other central structural principle ofthe Constitution-the separation ofpowers.
The Court's reinvigoration of separation-of-powers limits on the actions of the
national government preceded the current federalism revival.8 There too, the
justices have swung between formal and functional understandings of constitutional structure.9 At present, the Court unpredictably moves between both
approaches, typically invoking a formal approach to the separation of powers
to invalidate actions by one of the branches," while falling back on a functional understanding to uphold a challenged action." The result has been a
widely noted incoherence in separation-of-powers jurisprudence.' 2
5. See infra Part ILA (discussing "The Formalist Turn").
6. See infra Part ILB (detailing "The Functionalist Response").
7. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky noted the recent formalisttum in the Court's federalism
jurisprudence and compared that development with the justices' approach to the separation of
powers. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism andFunctonalism in FederalismAnal-

ysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997). Professor Chemerinsky's treatment is characteristically
thoughtful, but the scope and nature of our analyses differ considerably.
8.

The Supreme Court began its reinvigoration of separation-of-powers principles in the

early 1980s. For my analysis of that development, see generally Keith Werhan, Toward an
Eclectic Approach to Separation ofPowers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HAST. CONST.
L.Q. 393 (1989).
9.

See id at 396-410 (outlining formalist and functionalist approaches used in Court's

pre-Olsen decisions concerning separation of powers).
10. See, e.g., Clintonv. City ofNewYork, 524 U.S. 417,439-49(1998) (ruling LineItem
Veto Act inconsistent with Framers' Article I delegation of legislative power to Congress).
11. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,380-411 (1989) (upholding Sentencing Reform Act in face of separation-of-powers challenge).
12. See generallyRebeccaL. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA.

L. REv. 1513 (1991) (noting incoherence in Supreme Court's separation-of-powers jurispru-

1216

57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1213 (2000)

The justices have an opportunityto learn from their separation-of-powers
experience as they rethink their approach to the federalism limits on congressional power. It is important that the Court break the tendency to cycle
between a strict formalism and a permissive functionalism when resolving
issues of constitutional structure. The essential task facing the justices is to
settle on a methodology that blends both approaches. The Court has not yet
accomplished that goal in its separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Ithas faced
a similar difficulty in its attempts to delineate federalism-based limits on
congressional regulatory authority. While the Marshall Court, I shall argue,
established a balanced approach that was consistent with the federalist understanding of federalism, later Courts lost, and have never regained, that balance.
Although translating the constitutional organizing principle of federalism
into an appropriately balanced doctrine has proven to be something of a

conundrum, a potential solution, surprisingly, is in sight. In the Supreme
Court's recent, and potentially transformative, decision in United States v.

Lopez, 13 which it recently solidified in United States v. Morrison,14 a bare

majority of the justices suggested an intriguing redefinition of the congressional commerce power.'" The Lopez/Morrisoninnovation promises to integrate
formal and functional approaches to federalism limits and to align contemporary doctrine with the original federalist understanding and the foundational
jurisprudence of the Marshall Court. 6 The justices, however, have given
mixed signals of their direction. Following on the heels of Lopez, the same
narrow majority of justices in Printz v. United States" adopted a strongly
fornalistic approach to limiting congressional regulatory power.' The Printz
dence); E. Donald Elliot, Why OurSeparationofPowersJurisprudencelsSoAbysmal,57 GEO.
WASEL L. REV. 506 (1989) (same); Harold . Krent, Separatingthe Strandsin Separation of

PowersControversies,74 VA. L. REV.1253 (1988) (same); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation ofPowers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225 (1991) (same). Martin

Redish and Elizabeth Cisar, in noting the "split personality" of the justices, offered perhaps the
most vivid encapsulation of this incoherence. See generally Martin R-Redish & Elizabeth .
Cisar,

'f Angels Were To Govern": The Need ForPragmaticFormalism in Separationof

Powers Theory, 41 DuE L.J. 449 (1991) (noting high degree of inconsistency in Supreme
Court's application of either functionalism or formalism in separation-of-powers cases).
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
15. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740,1751 (2000) (invalidating Violence
Against Women Act, in part because "gender-motivated crimes of violence" do not constitute
economic activity subject to federal regulation under Commerce Clause); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-64 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free Schools Act because no economic
activity that would substantially affect interstate commerce fell within scope ofAct).
16. See infra Part IlA (discussing "Lopez/Morrison").
17. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
18. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904-33 (1997) (invalidating interim pro-
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retrenchment reinforces the considerable doubts over whether the Court will
be able to maintain a balanced federalism jurisprudence. Yet, in the recent
case Reno v. Condon, 9 a unanimous Court limited Printz, and in doing so,
may have signaled the justices' determination to regain their balance.2 °
This Article explores the contemporary crossroads of federalism jurisprudence. In Part I, I describe the "federalist balance" that formed the foundational conception of federalism limits on congressional regulatory power. In
Part II, I briefly review the "federalism pendulum," which embodies the swing
between formal and functional doctrine as the Court resisted, then embraced,
congressional power to control the modem economy. In Part El, I look at the
contemporary search for balance, focusing on the Court's decisions in Lopez
and Printz, as well as the Court's recent applications of those decisions in
Morrison and Reno, for the clues they offer concerning the character of the
current federalism revival.
I. The FederalistBalance
The framers sought to devise a government that was energetic, but limited, effective, yet safe.21 To the founding generation, or at least to those of
the federalist persuasion who moved the people of the United States to adopt
the Constitution of 1787, the tension produced by these dueling aspirations
did not make conflict inevitable. Instead, the founders saw their commitments
to an energetic national government and to individual liberty as mutually
reinforcing and producing balanced governance.'
vision of Brady Handgun 'Violence Prevention Act because it would require state officials to
execute federal law).
19. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
20. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671-72 (2000) (holding Driver's Privacy
Protection Act to be valid and not inconsistent with Printz because Act does not compel states
to regulate); see also infraPart 111B (detailing "PrintzReno").
21. See DAVID F. EPsTEIN, THE PoLITIcAL THEORY OF THE FEDERAIST 146 (1984)

(explaining that Constitution's structure provides for safe, yet useful government); THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226-28 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941) (stating goals for new
government).
22.

See RALPHKETCHAM, FRAMEDFORPOSTERITY: THEENDURwGPHILOSOPHYOFTE

CONSTIrUTON 62 (1993) (describing eighteenth-century view that balancing power in government was optimal for maintaining liberty); Hary N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution:
The Original Understanding, in AMmECANLAW AND THE CONSTrTmONAL ORDER HmTo icALPERSPECrVEs 85,89-92 (Lawrence M. Friedman & HarryN. Scheiber eds., 1978) (articulating Hamilton's and Madison's views as expressed in The Federalist). As explained in one
of the introductory essays of The Federalist,a central goal of the constitutional project was to
frame a national government that would safeguard both the union and individual liberty. THE
FEDERALST No. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Modem Library ed., 1941). Indeed, in the federalist view,
"the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5
(Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ad., 1941). By the same token, the government would
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Both of the Constitution's central structural principles - federalism and
the separation ofpowers - reflect this aspiration ofbalance between the ideals
of effective government and limited government.' Moreover, both principles
invoke the same strategy in pursuit of that balance: they divide the power of
governance.24 Federalism divides power vertically between the national government and the states. The separation of powers, in turn, divides the power
of the national government horizontally into three categories - legislative,
executive, and judicial - and assigns each of the three powers to a different,
and distinctively organized, institution ofthe government.
With respect to both principles, the Constitution's division of power
operates according to the same calculation. In each case, the fiamers sought

effective government by assigning authority to the institution most competent
to handle it. Thus, the separation of powers assigns each of the three categoies of governmental power to an institution that the framers designed specifically to exercise that type of power. In this view, a multimember, bicameral,
broadly representative legislature is our optimal lawmaker; a unitary, indirectly elected executive is our optimal law-administrator; and an independent
judiciary is our optimal law-adjudicator.2 6
A similar judgment inheres in the federalism principle. Rather than
dividing the power of government into its constituent parts, as separation-ofpowers theory does, the federalism principle divides governmental power by
subject matter. The Constitution thereby assigns to the national government
receive its energy from the active involvement of a free people. See KETCHAM, supra, at 40
(describing idea of"self-governing society" that framers instilled in Constitution). For a recent
study of the centrality of the metaphor of "balance" to the political thinking of the founding
generation, see Richard Striner, Political Newtonianism: The Cosmic Model of Politics in
Europe and America, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 583, 598-608 (1995) (outlining development of
Newtonian political thought in late eighteenth-century America).
23. See BEER, supra note 1, at 283-301 (discussing how federalism and separation of
powers in government ensure maintenance of both liberty and efficiency).
24. See id. at 96-97 (proposing that division of power among branches ofnational government as well as division of power between national government and state governments produces
effective governing while protecting individual rights).
25. See THE FEDI
T No. 73, at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941) (explaining how division of power between legislative and executive branches would
prevent "enaction of improper laws"); M.C. VILE, CONSTII'UTIONAiSM AND THE SEPARA)ION
OF Powms 14 (2d ed. 1967) (defining separation of powers). Constitution-makers who adopt
the separation of powers, however, typically modify this "pure" description of the model. Id.
For my account of the American adaptation, see Werhan, supra note 8, at 434-43.
26. See BEEZR, supra note 1, at 285-87 (describing Madison's idea that for government
to be truly effective, agencies "differently appointed, composed, qualified and empowered" to
perform special functions should perform those special functions); THE EDERAlIST No. 70,
at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941) (emphasizing importance of strong
executive); TBE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 503-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941) (articulating importance ofjudiciary in maintaining balanced government).
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a number of specified "objects" that concern "the great and aggregate interests" of "all the members of the republic," leaving the remainder, which
concern the "local and particular" interests of the people, to the statesY In
this view, not only did the framers create national governing institutions best
able to handle the type of power assigned to them, but they also structured an
'2

overall national government "commensurate to the exigencies of the Union. 8
The dispersal of power that the separation of powers and federalismprescribe, however, created governments that are limited, as well as competent.
In each theory, the power divisions among governing institutions safeguard
individual liberty by defeating 'tyranny," which Publius defined as the "accu-

mulation of all powers... in the same hands."' 2 In combination, the two
theories are istrumental in the creation of "the compound republic of Amer-

ica," which offers a "double security" for 'the rights of the people."3 The
principles of federalism and separation ofpowers each reflect the insight that,
in Ralph Ketcham's phrase, "only power could check power."'31

More subtly, the dispersal of authority accordingto separation-of-powers
and federalism principles limits government because it encourages moderation.3 2 Because no governmental entity possesses all of the powers of govern27. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941); see also
TBE FEDERALiST No. 14, at 82 (James Madison) (Moder Library ed., 1941) (emphasizing that
"general" government has limits on its jurisdiction).
28. See TEE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 297 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941)
(suggesting that proposed system offederalism would be necessary for survival of Union).
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941) (defining tyranny). "Publius" is the pen name taken by the three authors of The Federalist,Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. See THE FEDERALIST, at xxiii-xxv (Modem Library
ed., 1941) (providing biographies of authors of The Federalist).I use "Publius," rather than the
individual names of the authors, to respect the text's claim to single authorship and to acknowledge the essential consistency among the authors. See EPSTEIN, supranote 21, at 2 (observing
evidence of collaboration among authors); Martin Diamond, The Federalist'sView ofFederalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERAISM 34 n.* (Institute for Studies in Federalism ed., 1961) (noting
consistency of The Federalist).For a contrary view, see generally Alpheus Thomas Mason, The
Federalist-ASplitPersonality,57 Am HIST. REV. 625 (1952) (illustrating differences between
writings of Hamilton and writings of Madison).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941); see
also MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, T F) DMRAUST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 163 (1987)
(explaining Madison's view of "double security" in government with federalism and separation
of powers).
31.
KETCHAM, supranote 22, at 62; see also DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OFAMERICAN CONSTrirTONAL.SM 85-86 (1988) (articulating Madison's idea that to overcome tyranny
in government, each area of government must face difficulty in realizing its objectives).
32. See PETER B. KNLTFER, THE UNION As IT IS: CONSTITUTIONAL UNIONISM AND
SEcTIoNAL CoMPROMSE, 1787-1861, at 40-41 (1991) (articulating federalists' argument that
Constitution "contained institutional restraints that... encouraged moderate conduct"). To the
federalists, wise leadership, in its essence, embodied the value of moderatiom Id. at 44. For
a discussion of the appreciation ofthe "virtues of moderation" in early America, see id.at 56-85.
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ment, the actions of each are checked by the others. At the national level, each
branch is counterpoised against the others: "[a]mbition... counteract[s] ambition."3 3 Just as the separation ofpowers positions each branch ofthe national
government to provide crosschecks on one another, federalism positions the
national government and the states to counter the excesses of each other.'
The dual quality ofboth structural principles - the simultaneous attention
to effective government and limited government - is a source of their strong
appeal. They assure us we can have it all. Not surprisingly, however, this
duality also has caused considerable difficulty in the elaboration of doctrines
to give effect to these principles. The commitment to effective government
encourages functionalism in both federalism and separation-of-powers doctrine. After all, both principles assigned powers to governing entities based on
the fiamers' assessments of each entity's essence, and thus, of each entity's
institutional
competence. A functional methodology is true to those assign35
ments.

Yet that is only halfthe story. Constitutional assignments of governmental authority are grounded on categorical grants - by subject matter with
respect to federalism and by power-type with respect to the separation of
powers. Because the framers were serious about holding governmental
entities within the limits of those categorical grants, formalism also exerts a
continuing pull on structural doctrine. Formalism is true to the textual limits
on governmental authority."
This discussion demonstrates that the choice between formalism and
functionalism as guiding methodologies for principles of governmental structure - a problem that has haunted both federalism and separation-of-powers
jurisprudence - is a false choice. It is false because it is untrue to the framers'
deployment of these principles toward the goals of both effective government
and limited government. The only methodology that can be true to the constitutional design is one that integrates formal and finctional understandings of
governmental power. The only approach to federalism and to the separation
of powers that serves the ultimate goal of balanced, moderate government is
one that appropriately balances and moderates the legitimate claims of functionalism and formalism. Reviewing courts must allow governmental instittions the functional ability to achieve their constitutional ends, but also must
33. THEFEDERALISTNO. 51,supra note 30, at 33.
34. See THE FEPDm.uIST No. 28, at 174-75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941) (describing role of state governments in limiting national government); THE FEDERAlIST
No. 46, at 308-11 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941) (maintaining that state power is
essential in preventing encroachment of national authority); THE FEDERAlISTNO. 51,supranote
30, at 339-41 (arguing importance of division ofpowerin government for protecting all interests).
35. See supranote 3 and accompanying text (detailing functional approach to federalism).
36. See supranote 2 and accompanying text (describing formalist approach).
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hold those institutions within the formal limits of those ends. The Marshall
Court knew this, and delineated the limits federalism imposes on congressio-

nal regulatory power accordingly.37

A. The FederalistBalance in the MarshallCourt
One of the early tasks of the Supreme Court, inevitably, was to build a
jurisprudential foundation for the constitutional commitment to federalism,
and with it, a judicial approach for evaluating assertions of congressional

regulatory power. In 1803, the Marshall Court issued its first important

constitutional decision, Marbury v. Madison. 8 InMarbury,the Court exer-

cised, and justified, a power to review actions by the other branches of the
national government for their lawfulness and consistency with the Constitution.39 In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for his Court, assured
political decisionmakers that the justices would not review their decisions for
policy agreement, but only for fidelity to law.' The Court followed Marbury's establishment of the judicial role across the horizontal plane of separation of powers with a complimentary, vertical assertion of its authority within

the federal system to review the decisions of state actors for their compliance

with the Constitution and laws ofthe United States.4
Having established its role as authoritative interpreter ofthe constitutional
design within the s eparation-of-powers/federalism matrix,4 2 the Marshall Court

was in position to settle the regulatory role of Congress in a federal system.
The Marshall Court did so within a five-year stretch of the early national
37. I have considered the integration of formalism and functionalism with respect to the
separation of powers in other essays. See generally Werhan, supra note 8; Keith Werhan,
Normali'ng the Separation ofPowers, 70 TEU.. L. REV.2681 (1996) (describing methodology
for separation-of-powers jurisprudence that utilizes both functionalism and formalism).
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166-67 (1803) (holding that courts
can review Executive Branch actions that stem from constitutionally granted powers).
40. See id. at 166, 177 (defining Court's power to review legal actions but not political
decisions of Executive Branch). The Court underscored that "[ilt
is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. In this understanding,
of course, the Constitution is "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" that the Court
is responsible for interpreting and enforcing. Id. at 177.
41. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 413-415 (1821) (explaining that
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over cases originating in state court to determine
questions of constitutionality); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304,351 (1816)
(maintaining that Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction over cases originating in
state court is consistent with Constitution).
42. In establishing this judicial role, the Marshall Court acted as Publius had wished. See
T
FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 26, at 505 (outlining duty ofjudiciary to "declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void"). For a general discussion, see Sotirios
Barber,JudicialReviewand The Federalist, 55 U. CmL L. REV.836 (1988).
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period, decidingMcCullochv. Maryland43 in 1819 and Gibbons v. Ogden' in
1824. InMcCulloch and Gibbons, the Marshall Court elaborated a doctrine
that reflected a balanced approach to federalism that was securely situated in
the constitutional design.

1. McCulloch
At issue in McCulloch was the constitutional power of Congress to
incorporate a national bank.4" The difficulty was that the framers had not
explicitly included this power in the Article I, Section 8 delineation of congressional authority. 6 The problem was at once fundamental and ordinary.
It was fundamental because the issue went to the heart of the constitutional
structure of congressional power - the degree of flexibility Congress possessed to deploy the enumerated powers to achieve the legislators' conception

of the national interest. It was ordinary because, in practice, the extent of
Congress's authority arising from its enumerated powers confronts Congress

every day it is in session.
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, began his consideration of

the McCulloch problem by recognizing what Publius repeatedly had emphasized: the government of the United States "is acknowledged by all to be one
of enumerated powers."'47 Nevertheless, the absence of a provision for "estab43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,400-25 (1819) (upholding Congressional action in incorporating National Bank and establishing branch ofNational Bank in state of Maryland).
44. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,186-222 (1824) (determining that Congress has sole power to
regulate interstate commerce and thus invalidating New York statute that, if exercised, would
be contrary to federal regulation).
45. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,401 (1819).
46. The framers intentionally excluded this power from Congress's expressly delineated
powers. SeeMinutesofthe ConstitutionalConvention (September14,1787), in I[TBE R1ECORDS
oF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911) (describing discussion
among framers concerning possible expansion ofArticle I powers). On September 14, 1787,
as the Constitutional Convention neared completion, James Madison moved that Congress be
given the power "to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require
and the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent" Id. at 615. Rufus King
objected that such a power in Congress was "unnecessary." Id. When James Wilson responded
that the power "is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the generalwelfare," King
became more specific in his objection. Id. at 615-16. He worried that Congress would use this
power, among other things, to create a bank. Id. at 616. George Mason suggested limiting the
power "to the single case of canals," but even as so limited, Madison's motion lost decisively
(three in favor, eight opposed). Id. For Chief Justice Marshall's response to the absence of the
power to incorporate from among the enumerated powers of Congress, see infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
47. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; see also TH FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 82 (James Madison)
(Modem Library ed., 1941) (stating that national government's jurisdiction is "limited to certain
enumerated objectives"); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 249 (James Madison) (Modem Library
ed., 1941) (same); THEFEDERAL.STNO. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1941)
(maintaining that powers delegated to national government are "few and defined").
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lishing a bank or creating a corporation" was not fatal to Congress's claim of
power.48 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the constitutional commitment
to the doctrine of enumerated powers did not foreclose the existence of
"incidental or implied powers" in Congress.49 Thus, the issue was joined.
The textual home for Congress's implied powers, in Chief Justice Marshall's reading, is the Necessary and Proper Clause. One of the enumerated
powers in Article I, Section 8, the clause authorizes Congress to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing [enumerated] Powers... [of Article I, Section 8]. '"50 Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that the clause provides Congress some "right ... of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers."5" The interpretative battle
in McCulloch was over the scope of that right.
The State of Maryland offered a restricted interpretation ofthe Necessary
and Proper Clause, focusing on its "peculiar language."52 The word "necessary," Maryland argued, limited Congress's "right to pass laws for the execution ofthe granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without which the
power would be nugatory." 3 This interpretation would deny Congress any
meaningful latitude with respect to "the choice of means" to effectuate its
powers.5 4 Instead, in this view, the Necessary and Proper Clause tracks congressional legislation on the path that is "most direct and simple" to that end.5 5
48. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406 (noting that Constitution does not require all powers
to be "expressly and minutely described").
49. Id. Chief Justice Marshall took solace in the wording of the Tenth Amendment,
which provides that "It]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.

CoNsT. amend. X. As Chief Justice Marshall noticed, this reservation omits the word "expressly," which had been included in a parallel provision of the Articles of Confederation in
order to preclude the existence of implied powers in the national Congress. See McCulloch, 17
U.S. at 406; THE ARTIrLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IL To the Chief Justice, this omission
reflected the framers' intention to avoid the "embarrassments" caused by the ineffectiveness of
Congress during the confederation period. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406-07.

The Chief Justice's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment's omission of the term "expressly" tracks Publius's explanation of the framers' decision not to similarly qualify the Necessary and Proper Clause. See THE FEDERAuISTNO. 44, supra note 28, at 293 (discussing decision
not to limit Congress's powers to those "expressly" delegated). Publius argued that inclusion
of the "expressly" qualifier either would "disarm the government of all real authority whatever,"
or it would force Congress into the position "of violating the Constitution by exercising powers
indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly granted." Id. (emphasis

omitted).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,412 (1819).
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id. The state also offered an even more restrictive interpretation of the Necessary and
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Maryland's interpretive position was hardly new. It repeated the constitutional objections to the first Bank of the United States, which Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton proposed in 1790.6 Thomas Jefferson, as
Secretary of State, and James Madison, in the House of Representatives, led
the opposition.5 1 Both argued that a broad interpretation ofthe Necessary and

Proper Clause would be not merely wrong, but dangerous. Their concern was
that recognition of a general authority in Congress to select the means for
effectuating the Article I powers would defeat the constitutional enumeration
of those powers, in effect yielding to the national government a general
legislative power.5 " Jefferson explained:
[The constitution allows only the means which are "necessary" not those
which are merely "convenient," for effecting the enumerated powers. If
suchalatitude of constructionbe allowed to this phrase asto give anynonenumerated power [to Congr ,] ... [i]t would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase... Therefore it wasthat
the constitution restrained [Congress] to the necessarymeans, that is to
say, to those means without which the grant ofpower would be nugatory. 9
According to Jefferson, because the enumerated powers of Article I could "all
be carried into execution without a bank," the creation of such an institution
was "not necessary, and consequently not authorized" by the Necessary and

Proper Clause.'c
Proper Clause, arguing that the framers had included the provision simply to clarify that
Congress could exercise the enumerated powers in the form of legislation. Id. at 412. The
Court rejected that interpretation summarily, noting that the ability to enact legislation was
inherent in the Constitution's grant of the legislative power to Congress. Id. at 412-13; see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
56. See STANEY ELKINs & ERIC MCKrRIcK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 226 (1993)

(describing Hamilton's proposal for National Bank).
57. See id.at 224 (discussing Jefferson's and Madison's opposition to National Bank).
58. See id. at 230-32 (discussing Madison's assertion that Constitution grants national
government only limited, enumerated powers).
59. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionalityof the Billfor Establishinga
NationalBank,Feb. 15, 1791, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 278 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1974). Jefferson feared that if Congress were allowed "a single step beyond the
boundaries thus specially drawn around the [enumerated] powers... [it would] take possession
ofa boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Id. at 276.
60. Id. at 278. Professor Randy Barnett recently has offered a stimulating argument that
would revive the Jeffersonian position of a sharply limited necessary and proper power. See
generally Randy E. Barnett, Necessary andProper,44 UCLAL. REV. 745 (1997). Professor
Barnett argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read as a general limitation on
congressional power. Id. at 745. Whenever Congress acts in a way that affects individual
liberty, he would have a reviewing court shift the burden to Congress to justify its action. Id.
at 787. Professor Bamett's position shares the risk and reward of the Jeffersonian interpretation, but I believe the McCulloch Court has the better of the argument.
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Maryland agreed with Jefferson, but the McCulloch Court, following
President George Washington, did not.' Indeed, although it often is overlooked, McCulloch did not present the Marshall Court with its first occasion
to interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause. In United States v. Fisher,62
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, summarily rejected the argument that an Act of Congress, which provided that a claim ofthe United States
had priority in a bankruptcy proceeding, exceeded the necessary and proper
power.63 The Chief Justice dismissed the Jeffersonian interpretation, observing that requiring congressional legislation to be "indispensably necessary
to give effect to [an enumerated] power" would cause "endless difficulties."
The Chief Justice in Fisher clearly indicated the direction of his
preferred reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. He explained, "Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any
means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the
constitution. it

Notwithstanding the Fisher precedent, the longstanding controversy
surrounding the Bank of the United States made it clear that Chief Justice
Marshall andhis Court could not summarilypass over the necessary and proper
In addition, I think Professor Bamett's approach is normatively troubling. His approach
would tip the constitutional balance between effective government and limited government
too far in the latter direction. The modem Supreme Court wisely dispenses with the usual presumption of constitutionality only with respect to types of legislation in considerable tension
with constitutional norms, such as classifications grounded on race and gender and deprivations
of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)

(plurality opinion) (stating that "usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate" with
respect to laws that intrude on "family living arrangements"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197
(1976) (stating that "[teo withstand Constitutional challenge... classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement"
thereof); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting that statutory provisions

based on racial classifications are subject to "most rigid scrutiny" (quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))). To treat all congressional legislation that in any way
impinges on individual liberty as constitutionally suspect retreats too far in the discredited
direction ofLochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (declaring
that states' power to legislate cannot impinge on "liberty of person and freedom of contract").
61. President Washington signed the law creating the first Bank of the United States only
two days aft receiving Jefferson's memorandum urging him to cast a veto on constitutional
grounds. ELKINs & MCKrIRIcK, supra note 56, at 232-33. Hamilton also submitted to President Washington a memorandum that supported the bank and responded to Jefferson's objections. Id.at 232-33; see also infra notes 71, 88, 90 and accompanying text (detailing arguments
advocating strong Congressional power in federalist system).
62. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
63. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358,396-97 (1805) (rejecting narrow
definition ofNecessary and Proper Clause).
64. Id. at 396.
65.

Id.
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issue inMcCulloch.' The Court, quite rightly, approached the clause anew,
and in doing so, completed the sketch begun in Fisher. In upholding Congress's powerto incorporate a bank, Chief Justice Marshall inMcCulloch once
again offered an embracing interpretation ofthe Necessary and Proper Clause:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of
a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention ofthose who
gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their
beneficial execution. This could not be done by confiding the choice of
means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to
adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the
end.6

In supporting this broad reading ofthe Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Chief Justice offered broad justifications. He drew on the nature of the Constitution, which he distinguished from a "legal code."' The former, by "[ilts
nature,.. . requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."'69 As Chief
Justice Marshall famously
added, "we must never forget, that it is a constitu7°
tion we are expounding.
He might as well have added, "we must remember that it is a government
the Constitution created." Chief Justice Marshall not only supported his broad
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause with an argument from the
nature of the Constitution, but also supported it with the nature of a functioning government. 71 For the Chief Justice, "a government, entrusted with such
66. See CHARLEsWARREN, 1 TE SuME COURTINUNrrED STATESHITORY499-540
(1922) (placing McCulloch v. Maryland in historical context).
67. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,412 (1819).
68. Id. at407.
69. Id. For this reason, Chief Justice Marshall was untroubled by the absence of a power
of incorporation among Congress's enumerated powers. The power to create a corporation is
not an end in itself, but simply is a means toward an end. Id. at 421. Thus, the Chief Justice
explained, "we find no reason to suppose that a constitution, omitting, and wisely omitting, to
enumerate all the means for carrying into execution the great powers vested in government,
ought to have specified this." Id.
70. Id. Chief Justice Marshall's argument concerning the nature of the Constitution
tracked Publius's account of the framers' rationale for adding the Necessary and Proper Clause
as a general supplementary provision to the Article I, Section 8 enumeration, rather than
attempting "a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms 'necessary and proper."' TuE FEDELAlST No. 44, supra note 28, at 293. Publius explained that the
latter course "would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the
Constitution relates." Id.
71. Alexander Hamilton emphasized this focus in his memorandum to President Washington responding to Jefferson's urging of a veto of the bank bill. Hamilton argued that "[i]t is
essential to the being of the National government" that Jefferson's interpretation of the term
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ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of
the nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for
their execution."7 2 Thus, by "general reasoning,"73 without the need for the
Necessary and Proper Clause,74 "the
75 powers given to the government imply

the ordinary means of execution.
For Chief Justice Marshall, the arguments from the nature of the Constitution and from the nature of government cohered into a vision of an effective,

flexible, and adaptable authority in Congress to implement its enumerated
powers as the legislators believed appropriate to address the needs of the
nation. The Court approached the Necessary and Proper Clause as a provision

embedded within the interpretive context of a "constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
'
The implication the Chief Justice drew from the permahuman affairs. 76

nence of the Constitution in a changeable world was clear:
To have prescnbed the means by which government should, in all future
time, execute its powers, would have been... an unwise attempt to provide, byimmutable rules, for exigencies which, ifforeseen at all, must have
been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To
have declared thatthebestmeans shallnotbe used, butthose alone without
which the power would be nugatory, would have beento deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason,
and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.17
"necessary" be "exploded." Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionalityofan Act to
Establish a Bank, Feb. 23, 1791, in VIII TBE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMmTON 63, 102

(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). Hamilton believed that Jefferson's limited understanding of the
reach of congressional power "would be fatal to the just &indispensable authority of the United
States." Id. at 97.
72. MCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408. The Chief Justice continued: "The power being given,
it is in the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and
cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution by
withholding the most appropriate means." Id. Chief Justice Marshall simply could not accept
"[t]he baneful influence of [the state's] narrow construction [of the Necessary and Proper
Clause] on all the operations of the government, and the absolute impracticability of maintaining it without rendering the government incompetent to its great objects." Id. at 417-18.
73. Id. at411.
74. Id. at419.
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. at415.
77. Id. at 415-16. Chief Justice Marshall again tracked Publius, who had argued that a
complete, constitutional listing of legislative means available to Congress, in lieu of the
necessary and proper catch-all, would have required the framers to predict "all the possible
changes which futurity may produce." See The FEDEP.AL.STNO. 44, supra note 28, at 294 ("[I]n
every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the means of
attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be
often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.").
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For Chief Justice Marshall, only a broad construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause was true to the essence of the constitutional project itself, to
create a government that would be capable of governing effectively in an
unknowable future s
In adopting such a broad acceptance of the implied powers of Congress
to effectuate the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8, Chief Justice
Marshall followed the lead of Publius. Publius largely devoted Federalist23
to emphasizing the "simple" and "uniform" "axioms" that constitute the principal theme of McCulloch: "The means ought to be proportioned to the end;
the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought
to possess the means by which it is to be attained."79 Thus, as would Chief
Justice Marshall, Publius recognized that "government ought to be clothed
with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust.""0 Publius also
rejected the Jeffersonian interpretation, much as Chief Justice Marshall did.
Publius explained, "Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and
propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands
which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.""'
In Federalist33 and 44, Publius defended the ftamers' inclusion of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
against stiff anti-federalist objection that the provision would enable the new
Congress to legislate without effective limitation.' Publius's defense was
unflinching. "Without the substance of this power," he claimed, "the whole
Constitution would be a dead letter.""3 Indeed, anticipating the Marshall
Court's ultimate position inMcCulloch, Publius observed that, even had the
78. Chief Justice Marshall followed Publius's lead when highlighting the importance of
interpreting the scope of national power with an eye toward allowing Congress the capacity to
address future contingencies that are unknowable at present See THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at
204-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941) (stating that there is nothing "more
fallacious than to infer the extent of any power... in the national government, from an estimate

of its immediate necessities").
79. THE FEDERAI.IST No.23, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941);
see also THE FEDERALSTNO. 31, at 188,190 (AlexanderHamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941)
(including this ends-means principle among "primary truths, or first principles" of governance).
80. TBE FEDERAUST No.23, supranote 79, at 142.
81. Id. at 144.
82. See TBEFEDERASTNO.33, at 198 (AlexanderHamilton) (ModemLibraryed., 1941)
(supporting Necessary and Proper Clause and noting that it is responsibility of government to
judge "proper exercise of its powers"); JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS:
CRrics OF TE CoNsT
oN, 1781-1788, at 122-24 (1961) (urging that "Congress must be
granted only limited authority" under anti-federalist thought); HERBERT J.STORING, WHAT THE
ANTI-FEDERAMSTS WEREFOR 28-29 (1981) (noting that anti-federalists considered it imprudent
to grant powers without limits because it gave government free reign).
83. TBE FEDERALST NO. 44, supra note 28, at 292.
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framers not included the Necessary and Proper Clause, "there [could] be no
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general
powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication."84
Publius added, in language Chief Justice Marshall later echoed: "No axiom
is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is
required, the means are authorized, wherever a general power to85do a thing is
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included."
In Publius's defense of the Necessary and Proper Clause, however, he
fiustratingly failed to suggest a definition of the key term, "necessary."86 That
task was left to the Court inMcCulloch, which adopted a broad definition of
the term consistent with its own, and with Publius's, justification of the
clause.' Following Alexander Hamilton's reading ofthe clause in defense of
the first banks' constitutionality and in opposition to the Jeffersonian interpretation, Chief Justice Marshall equated the constitutional term "necessary" with
what he understood to be the common meaning of the term, that which is
"convenient, or useful, or essential to another."' He continued, "To employ
the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any
means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single
means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable." 9
In defining the term "necessary," the Chief Justice sharpened the work
of Publius by specifying the judicial check on congressional assertions of its
necessary and proper power. More specifically, the McCulloch test provides:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
84. Id. at 294.
85. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supranote 82, at 199 ("What is a power, but
the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of
employing the means necessary to its execution?").
86. See TBE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 82, at 198-200 (supporting Necessary and
Proper Clause and noting that it is responsibility of government to judge "proper exercise of its

powers").
87. Justice Frankfurter wrote that, although "[n]o judge writes on a wholly clean slate,"
Chief Justice Marshall bore "the duty of creation to a degree greater than falls to the lot of even
most greatjudges." FE=xFRANKFRTR, TBECOMMERcUECLASEUDERMARSHAUjTANEY,
AND WAIrE 12 (1978).
88. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819). In his argument
defending the constitutionality ofthe first bank, Hamilton wrote:
According to [the grammatical and popular sense of the term], necessary often
means no more than needful, requisite, incidental,usejul, or conducive to. It is a
common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government or a
person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than

that the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted, by the
doing ofthis or that thing.
HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 102.
89. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at413-14.
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all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional."'9 0 This doctrine reflected the Marshall Court's goal of achieving the balance mandated by the constitutional aspiration of an effective, but
limited government. Chief Justice Marshall made this understanding clear in

his introduction to the necessary and proper test:
We admit, as all must admit,thatthe powers ofthe government are limited,
and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction ofthe constitution must allowto the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it,
in the manner most beneficial to the people. 9
The McCulloch Court thus designed a judicial role that limits Congress to the
boundaries of its enumerated powers, yet allows legislative flexibility within
those boundaries.
The McCulloch test maintains the balance between effective government

and limited government by integrating formal and functional elements into its
construction of the federalism limits on congressional power. The Court
derives the formal dimension oftheMcCulloch test from its translation of the
enumerated powers of Congress into the authorized "ends" of legislative

action.' Those ends constitute the formal categories of congressional power.
The functionalism of the test resides in the broad authority that the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides Congress to select the "means" to achieve those
ends. In this framework, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not "enlarge"
congressional power beyond the markers placed by the enumerated powers,

nor does it "restrain the powers of Congress... to exercise its best judgment
90. Id. at 421. Chief Justice Marshall's test for evaluating congressional action pursuant
to the Necessary and Proper Clause followed the approach Hamilton had suggested with respect
to the first bank. Hamilton wrote: "Ifthe end be clearly comprehended within any of the
specified powers, & if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden
by any particular provision of the constitution - it may safely be deemed to come within the
compass of national authority." HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 107 (finding that Constitution
does not grant federal government complete sovereignty, rather "it is sovereign... [only] to the
extent of the objects of its
specified powers").
91. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at421.
92. Chief Justice Marshall's equation of the enumerated powers with "ends" was consistent with Publius's consistent conceptualization of those powers as "objects." See EPSTEIN,
supra note 21, at 43 (noting that "allowable ends" authorize means although means cannot be
delineated); supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing Constitution's assignment of certain objects to national government). It also underscores the Aristotelian, teleological orientation that underlies theMcCullochunderstanding of the constitutional authority of Congress. See
supra note 3 (describing purpose of teleological reasoning to explain something based on its
goal or end).
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in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers
of government."9
The federalist balance of the McCulloch test is aligned with the distinction between law and politics that lies at the center ofthe Marbury conception
of judicial review.' In Marbury;the Marshall Court emphasized the legal
nature of the Constitution's limitations on congressional authority.9' Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, "The powers ofthe legislature are defined and limited;
and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written."' But within those legal limits, governmental actors have discretion
to achieve the policy they believe to be in the public interest, without interference from the courts.' In the Marbury fiamework, when national political
actors "possess a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more
perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.""s
The formal/functional interplay oftheMcCullochtest follows Marbury's
law/politics fiamework. The formal dimension ofMcCulloch focuses on the
constitutionally prescribed, legal limits of national political authority. In
McCulloch, the Court emphasized the Marbury injunction that Congress, "in
the execution of its powers," could not pass laws "prohibited by the constitution." Nor could Congress cite one of its enumerated powers as a "pretext... for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [national]
government."'" So long as Congress remains within the formal limits on its
authority, the McCulloch orientation remains functional, with the Court
deferring to legislative judgment on "the degree of [a law's] necessity '101 in
accomplishing a constitutional end. As Marbury would describe it that judgment is one of politics, not law. Were judges to follow the Jeffersonian inter93. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at420.
94. For useful discussions of the law/politics distinction inMarbury,see generally George
L. Haskins, Law Versus Politicsin the Early Years ofthe MarshallCourt, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1981) (discussing achievements of Marshall Court and its effect on power of judiciary and
separation of law and politics); Jennifer Nedelsky, ConfiningDemocraticPolitics: Anti-Federalists,Federalists,and the Constitution,96 HARV. L. RV. 340 (1982) (considering implications

of law/politics distinction on balance between democracy and constitutionalism); William E.
Nelson, TheEighteenth-CenturyBackgroundofJohnMarshall'sConstitutionalJurisprudence,

76 MIcH. L. REV. 893 (1978) (considering motivation of Marshall Court decisions as shaped
by politics or principle).
95. The Marbury Court recognized the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

96.
97.

Id. at 176.
Id. at 166.

98.
99.

Id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,423 (1819).

100.
101.

Id.
Id.
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pretation and calibrate the relative need of congressional legislation, the McCulloch Court, following Marbury, warned they would "pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and... tread on legislative ground."'"
2. Gibbons
After McCulloch, the question remained how the justices should define
the enumerated powers, or ends, within congressional authority. The Marshall
Court would wait only five years before taking that next step. In Gibbons v.
Ogden, the Court defined the most important of Congress's regulatory powers,
that governing interstate commerce. 3 The Constitution's Commerce Clause
provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.""' The
GibbonsCourt's approachto the clause followed theMcCullochstrategy. The
Court integrated formal and functional elements in an effort to allow Congress
wide discretion to pursue regulatory goals within a defined boundary true to
the constitutional balance of power between nation and state.
Gibbonsarose from an effort by the states to parcel out exclusive navigation rights for steamboat operators within their territorial waters. Ogden, who
enjoyed a monopoly from the New York legislature to operate steamboats on
New York waters, had received an injunction from a New York court barring
Gibbons from operating his steamboats within the state.0 5 Gibbons, however,
held a potential trump card in the form of a federal license issued pursuant to
a congressional statute enacted in 1793.1' If Congress possessedthe constitutional power to control navigation, Gibbons's federal license would override
Ogden's state monopoly right pursuant to the Supremacy Clause."° The
Marshall Court held for Gibbons.'0
Chief Justice Marshall, again writing for his Court, began his analysis as
he had inMcCulloch. He first assessed the implications of the Constitution's
enumeration of congressional powers for the interpretive task of measuring
the scope ofthose powers. InMcCulloch, Maryland had argued that the logic
102. Id.
103.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196-98 (1824) (holding that Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate navigation of waters).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
105. Gibbons,22 U.S. at 1-3.
106. See DAVID P. CURInE THE CoNsnT oN
iN TE SUREnm CouRT: TI FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 168 n.74-75 (1985) (referencing federal statute authorizing
license that allowed Gibbons to operate steam boats between New York and New Jersey).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (stating that "[this Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land').
108. Gibbons,22 U.S. at 210-22.
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of enumeration required the Court to limit narrowly the reach ofthe Necessary
and Proper Clause."° The Chief Justice rejected that interpretive stance,
because it would have denied Congress its constitutional role of selecting
from among various legislative policy options the approach it believes best
addresses matters within the boundaries of the enumerated powers.'
In
Gibbons, Ogden argued similarly to Maryland, that the logic of enumeration
mandated that the powers generally be "construed strictly.""' Chief Justice
Marshall again rejected the suggestion, noting2 the absence of any such rule of
Construction in the text of the Constitution."
As in McCulloch, the Gibbons Court was guided by Publius's injunction to interpret the constitutional text in accordance with its "common-sense"
meaning." 3 As Publius observed, with respect to "a constitution of government... , the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any
technical rules, is the true criterion of construction."'1 4 Thus, while Chief
Justice Marshall accepted the impropriety of any "enlarged construction" of
the enumerated powers that would extend the text beyond its "natural and
obvious import," he found a "narrow construction" that would rob the text of
its common-sense meaning to be equally illegitimate." 5 The Chief Justice
saw in Ogden's proffered rule of construction the same infirmity that had
disabled Maryland's Jeffersonian interpretation of "necessary and proper" it would lead to an incompetent national government. The Gibbons Court,
true to McCulloch and to Publius as well, would not accept the "propriety" of a narrowing construction of the enumerated powers that would
render Congress "unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be institted.... 16
109. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,418-19 (1819).
110. Id. at419-420.
111. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,187 (1824).
112. Id.at 187-88.
113. THE FEDERkS No. 83, at 539-40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941); see also supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (defining Necessary and Proper
Clause using common understanding of term).
114. THERFEDERAUISTNo. 83,supranote 113,at540-41.
115. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188. Chief Justice Marshall, like Publius, adopted a rule of
construction with respect to Congress's enumerated powers that presumed the framers "employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." Id. at 188. In
case of ambiguity caused by "the imperfection of human language," the Chief Justice accepted
the "well settled rule that the objects for which [the power] was given, especially when those
objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction."
Id. at 188-89. In doing so, he adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation characteristic
of teleological functionalism. See supra note 3 (discussing meaning of functionalism and
consistency of term with Aristotelian thought).
116. Gibbons,22 U.S. at 188.
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With this background understanding of the Court's interpretive role,
Chief Justice Marshall began his analysis ofthe Gibbons problem by defining
Congress's commerce power. He did so as he said he would, by parsing the7
text of the Commerce Clause with an eye on its common-sense meaning.' s
He focused first on the subject matter of Congress's power, "commerce."fl
The Chief Justice rejected Ogden's effort to exclude navigation from Congress's regulatory power by essentially limiting "commerce" to the sale,
exchange, or traffic of goods." 9 While Chief Justice Marshall did not ques-

tion that trafficking in goods was "commerce," he did not accept that such12a0

"general term, applicable to many objects," was limited to that meaning.
Instead, the Gibbons Court opted for an understanding of "commerce" that
would encompass the complete range of commercial relationships. Chief
Justice Marshall explained: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic [in commodities], but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all of its branches, and
is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.' 2' Because
"[t]he mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
nations" that would exclude navigation, the framers should not be taken to
have excluded navigation by use of the term "commerce."'n Thus, in the
Gibbons understanding, "commerce" takes on the fumctional character of "a

general term," including everything that is part of the web of commercial
activity and relationships that Congress would need to include in a "system"
of international or interstate commercial regulation."s
117. Id. at 189-190.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 189-90.
120. Id. at 189.
121. Id. at 189-90.
122. Id. at 190. Chief Justice Marshall noted that the United States had regulated navigation "from the commencement of the government,... with the consent of all, and haed] been
understood by all to be a commercial regulation." Id. The Chief Justice added:
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce," to
comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood,
when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people ofAmerica adopted their
government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must
have understood it in that sense because all have understood it in that sense; and the
attempt to restrict it comes too late.
Id. Publius likewise connected control of navigation with the regulation of international
commerce. See THE FEDERA.ST No. 11, at 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941) (describing importance of national Navy to secure international trade and relations).
123. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,229-32 (1824). This functional definition of
commerce was true to the interpretive approach Chief Justice Marshall delineated earlier in the
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The Gibbons Court's definition of "commerce" settled the nature of the
activity that Congress could regulate. The Commerce Clause, however, also
limits Congress's power to reach that activity within two geographical realms,
one external to the nation, the other internal. 124 Within the external sphere,
the text suggests that Congress has complete authority to control commerce.
The Constitution does not qualify Congress's power to regulate commerce
"with foreign Nations."'" As Chief Justice Marshall signified by his emphasis on the need for Congress to address navigation rights in connection with
its regulation of the country's commercial relationships with other nations, a
narrow definition of "commerce" would have prevented Congress from
completely controlling matters of international commerce. 121 Such a narrow
understanding of commerce, therefore, was unacceptable.
In contrast with international commerce, the Commerce Clause does not
give Congress complete authority to regulate internal commerce. The text of
the Commerce Clause limits the jurisdiction of the national legislature to
commerce "among the several States."'" Here again, Chief Justice Marshall
embraced a broad, functional understanding of the text. He read the phrase
to attach congressional power to activity in the "interior" ofthe states, so long
The functionalism
as that activity "extend[s] to or affect[s] other States."''
of "commerce."
definition
earlier
the
of
that
with
aligns
of this interpretation
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate any activity within the
web of commercial relationships, anywhere in any state, so long as that activity extends to or affects any ofthe other states.
Gibbons opinion. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (noting Chief Justice Marshall's goals of interpreting Constitution based on "common-sense" meaning and on purpose).
124. In this discussion, I do not consider the nature of Congress's power to regulate commerce with Native American tribal governments.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3; see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193-94 (noting that commere cannot stop at states' borders; it extends into states).
126. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 229-30.
127. U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall tookthe
word "among" to mean, "intermingled with." Id. He wrote: "A thing which is among others,
is intermingled with them." Id.
129. Professor Richard Epstein suggested a narrower interpretation of the effect test of
Gibbons. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1405 (1987) (considering scope of congressional power under Commerce Clause).
Professor Epstein argued, "There is not the slightest hint that Chief Justice Marshall meant to

have the 'affects' qualification expand the specific objects to which the 'plenary' commerce
clause applies, beyond the control of interstate commercial transactions and the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce." Id. I think there are several such hints. The first and most obvious is
that Chief Justice Marshall explicitly rejected the limitation of commerce to commercial transactions. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-91 (1824). Moreover, nowhere in his
lengthy and expository opinion did the Chief Justice mention the term "instrumentalities" of

1236

57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1213 (2000)

The Gibbonsunderstanding of Congress's commerce power follows from
the theory of representative legitimacy that Chief Justice Marshall invoked in
McCulloch. In this account, the "only security against the abuse of [governmental] power" lies "in the structure of the government itself," whereby the
government operates on "its constituents," whose electoral power provides
them with the "influence" to ward off "erroneous and oppressive" measures.130
For such a political check to operate on the exercise of governmental power,
it is crucial that those who are affected have a political voice that the government has incentive to hear. When a state's action affects only its residents,
the political check is in full force. However, when state action substantially
burdens those who reside and vote in other states, the political check is
compromised, with a corresponding increase in the risk of an abuse in governing power. 31 On this theory, the national government has the strongest claim
to political legitimacy with respect to those activities with effects that substantially radiate beyond the borders of any one state. 132 Because the citizens of
each state send representatives to Congress, everyone who is affected by congressional regulation has had an opportunity to participate in the process of
that legislature's decision making. 133 As the McCulloch Court concluded,
interstate commerce or any similar term. Reversing the burden of persuasion on Professor
Epstein, there is nothing in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion that limits his discussion to steamboats plying interstate waterways. His language is broader and more inclusive, and presumably,
purposefully so.
There are other hints as well. For example, the operative phrase of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion includes activities that "extend to or affect other states." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194
(emphasis added). Professor Epstein's reading fits well the first category ("extend to"), but not
the disjunctive second ("affect"). Hint Why did the Chief Justice not qualify the disjunctive
term "affect" if he intended it simply to refer to the effects on the instrumentalities and transactions that "extend to" state lines? Reading "affect" broadly fits the general, ordinary usage of
the unqualified term. Moreover, an unqualified reading ofthe "affects" test fits the understanding of representative legitimacy that Chief Justice Marshall introduced in McCulloch, and also
fits his primary reliance on the political process to limit congressional power. See infra notes
143-50 and accompanying text (describing importance of representative legitimacy as political
check on governmental power). Finally, and most generally, Professor Epstein, throughout his
analysis, reads Gibbonswith a determination to limit congressional power to the most restrictive
category the case might bear. Epstein, supra, at 1401-08. That interpretative stance, however,
links Professor Epstein not to Chief Justice Marshall, but to those whose arguments the Chief
Justice rejected in McCulloch and Gibbons. Although I fully agree with Professor Epstein that
a certain formalism is important to Chief Justice Marshall's approach to congressional power,
see Epstein, supra, at 1406, 1 think Professor Epstein mistakenly discounted the clearly functional component ofthe Chief Justice's thinking.
130. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 428 (1819).
131. See id.at 429 (explaining that sovereignty of states ends at their borders).
132. See id. at 405 (stating that national government "is the government of all; its powers
are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all").
133. See id. at 435 (discussing exercise of power by individuals through congressional
representation).
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"[t]he difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between
1 34
the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole."
The power of the McCulloch understanding of representative legitimacy
comes through in Gibbons not only with respect to Chief Justice Marshall's
definition of what counts as interstate commerce, but also with respect to his
definition of Congress's power to "regulate." For the Gibbons Court, the
Commerce Clause gives Congress the complete power "to prescribe the rule
by which commerce is to be governed."' 3 5 The constraint on Congress is
political, not legal:
The wisdomandthe discretionof Congress, their identitywiththe people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this,
as in many other instances ....
the sole restraintson which [the framers]
have relied, to securethemfromits abuse. Theyarethe restraints onwhich
1
the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. 3
In adopting this broad understanding of congressional power, the Chief Justice
followed the formal/functional balance of the McCulloch framework: "[T]he
sovereignty of'1Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to

those objects."'

It is telling that Chief Justice Marshall's delineation ofthe congressional
commerce power came to rest on the people and the idea of representation. In
analyzing Congress's commerce power in this way, he not only aligned Gibbons withMcCulloch,he also followed the federalist understanding. InFederalist 45 and 46, Publius addressed anti-federalist fears that the new national
government would overwhelm the state governments, inevitably consolidating
all political power at the national level. Publius met the objection head on.
Because creation of a competent national government was "essential" to secure
the "happiness" of the American people, he argued, the displacement of some
pre-existing state authority was simply a byproduct of a necessary change,
rather than a legitimate basis for objection. 3 ' Publius continued:
Was ...
the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy
formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt,... not that the people
of America should enjoypeace, hierty, and safety, butthatthe government
134.

Id.at435-36.

135.

Gibbons v.Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,196 (1824) (explaining that "[the commerce]

power, like all others vested in [C]ongress, is complete in itselt may be exercised to its utmost

extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution").
136. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
137. Id.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,405 (1819) (notingthat

"the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action").
138. THE FEDERAHsTNO. 45, supranote 47, at 298.
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of the individual States ... might enjoy a certain extent ofpower, and be
arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?" 9

For Publius, '"he public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people,
is the supreme object" of the Constitution and of constitutional government. 40
"[A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness
of the people," Publius concluded, "the voice of every good citizen must be,
Let the former be sacrificed to the latter."' 4 '
In the federalist framework, the people not only are the ultimate object
of governmental power, but also they are the "ultimate authority." 42 Publius

thus identified the founding generation's commitment to popular sovereignty

as the conceptual key to balancing federalism. 43 The "arduous... task of
marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the general and
that ofthe State governments," 144 is not best understood as a treaty negotiation

between two contending powers grudgingly dividing up their sovereignty. To
Publius, the national and state governments are "kindred systems" that coexist
as "parts of one whole." 45 Federalism, then, is an effort to provide an overall
structure of government that would best serve the people. As Publius reminds
all those who would become preoccupied with questions of governmental
sovereignty, "[t]he federal and State governments are in fact but different
agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and
designed for different purposes."'" Neither Congress nor the state legislatures
are sovereign in any ultimate sense. 47
139. Id. at 298-99.
140. Id. at 299. Publius concluded the thought by noting, "no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment ofthis object" Id.
141. Id. In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall followed Publius in reminding Ogden that the
pre-existing sovereignty of the states "underwent a change" with ratification of the Constitution.
See Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824) (discussing character of state sovereignty before and after Constitution).
142. THE FEDERAIST No. 46, supra note 34, at 305.
143.
See BEEP, supra note 1, at 137, 152 (discussing establishment of federal system with
allocation of power made by people); KETCHAM, supra note 22, at 72 (viewing Constitution as
document through which people authorized redivision of sovereignty); GORDON S. WOOD,THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUEIC, 1776-1787, at 532, 447-54 (1969) (detailing enthusiasm of federalists in reservation of primary right of power in people). For a thoughtful study
of the power of the idea of popular sovereignty for the founding generation, see generally
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTiNG THE PEOPlE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTYINENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supranote 21, at 228.
145.
THE FEDERAUST NO. 82, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941)
(emphasis omitted).
146.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 34, at 304-05.
147. See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBuC: JURTSDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSMs IN THE UNnTD STATES, 1775-1787, at 200 (1983) (stating that reservation of
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Because ofthis ultimate reliance on popular will, Publius understood that
the working balance of power between the nation and the states would emerge
from the political process. That balance "will not depend merely on the
comparative ambition or address of the different governments," but will
instead ultimately "depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common
constiuents."'4 As a default position, Publius expected that "the first and
most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their
respective States."'49 He thus concluded:
K therefore, ... the people should in future become more partial to the
federalthanto the State governments, the change canonlyresult from such
manifest andirresistibleproofs ofabetter administration, as will overcome
all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they
may discover it to be most due .... 1-0
Publius, in this account, anticipated McCulloch and Gibbons. As would
the Marshall Court, he viewed federalism, and more particularly, the scope of
congressional power, through the lens of popular sovereignty. The end of
federalism, in their shared view, is not the preservation of sovereignty per se
in either the national government or in the states. Rather, it is the harnessing
of the powers and responsibilities of both levels of government as a means
toward the ultimate end of serving the collective good of a sovereign
people.'
The role of formalism in the federalist understanding, then, is not
so much to preserve preconceived notions of state or national governmental
sovereignty, but rather to keep each level of government within the authority
the people had entrusted to them.
Publius thus counterbalanced his defense of a competent national government with an overriding understanding that its power would be exercised only
within "a certain sphere."' 52 The states, therefore, retain "a very extensive
' or governing supremacy.'5 4 In this scheme,
portion of active sovereignty,"153
ultimate authority to people clarified question of whether state or federal government would be
sovereign); WooD, supra note 143, at 531 (explaining that lack of sovereignty by state legislatures or Congress exists because of emanation of power from people).
148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 34, at 305.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 306.
151. See KETCHAM, supra note 22, at 60 (discussing inclusion of people in affairs of
government to aid in pursuit of public good).
152. THE FEDERAUSTNO. 46, supra note 34, at306.
153.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 45, supra note 47, at 300.
154. When Publius used the term "sovereignty," as he often did, he used it to mean
"supremacy" in the relative sense of governmental jurisdiction. For a discussion of the concept
of sovereignty in American constitutionalism, see infra notes 392-400 and accompanying texL
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the powers ofthe federal government, although sufficient to control "the great
and aggregate interests" of the people, 5' nevertheless are "few and defined."'1'

Correspondingly, while the states are limited to the "local and

particular" interests of the people, 5 7 their powers remain "numerous and
indefinite.' 5 8 The national government exercises a governing sovereignty, or
supremacy, only
to a certain extent, as measured by the "objects of its speci159
fied powers."
Although McCulloch and Gibbons often are read as strongly nationalist
in intent,"6 the Marshall Court's framework for congressional power reflects
the federalist sensibility of balancing national and state powers. In McCulloch, after all, the Court established the enumerated powers of Congress as
the only permissible ends of national legislative action. The Court thus confined the necessary and proper power to the selection of policy to attain those
fixed goals. Indeed, in the McCulloch framework, the principal role of a
reviewing court is to ensure that Congress has not abused its necessary and
proper power by attempting to reach ends that the Constitution reserved for
161
the states.
In Gibbons, the Court again consciously preserved a balanced federalism
respectful of the governing status of the states. Chief Justice Marshall maintained the McCulloch assurance that the enumerated powers themselves fix
meaningful boundaries on congressional power. As he explained in Gibbons,
"[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated."'6 2 Inthe Gibbons
balance, the power of Congress over interstate commerce allowed regulation
of "commercial intercourse,' 163 broadly and functionally understood, within
a state that "extend[s] to or affect[s] other states,"'" but onlythat. The regula155. TBE VEDERAUSTNO. 1O, supranote27,at60.
156. THE FEDERAISTNo. 45, supranote 47, at 303.
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,supranote 27, at 60.
158. THE FEDERAUST No. 45, supra note 47, at 303. Publius continued: "The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs; concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." Id.
159. HAMILTON, supranote 71,at 107.
160. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (explaining that in Gibbons,
"Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded"); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 65-71 (1960) (discussing
McCulloch and Gibbonsin light of Marshall Court's desire to enhance national power).
161. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of
McCulloch 'sanalysis ofNecessary and Proper Clause).
162. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,195 (1824).
163. Id. at 189-90, 193 (recognizing Congress's power to regulate "every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations").
164. Id. at 194.
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tion of noncommercial matters, as well as "completely internal commerce,"' 65
remained outside Congress's commerce power.
To Chief Justice Marshall, the Gibbons definition of Congress's commerce power fit the essential constitutional balance of authority between
nation and state. He explained:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the States generally, but not those
which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of
executing some of the general powers of the government'"
Chief Justice Marshall's account, moreover, fit precisely with the federalist
understanding of federalismthat emerged fromthe constitutional convention. 67
The McCullochlGibbons articulation of the federalism balance, with its
mixing of formal and functional understandings of the scope of congressional
power, created an allocation ofpower that allowed both levels of government
the competence to address matters within their authority. In this scheme, the
national government controlled selected matters designated by the Constitution as within national concern, with a broad, undefined remainder of authority left to the state governments. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century America, the thoroughly local concerns of the individual states
constituted "a very extensive portion of active sovereignty."" 6
ff. The FederalismPendulum
The Marshall Court's decisions inMcCulloch and Gibbons established
a juridical settlement of the federalism limits on congressional regulatory
power that aligned constitutional law with the federalist vision. That settlement built on a concerted effort by the early national government to lay an
economic foundation for the growth of a national market. 6 9 With the increas165.

Id. at 195.

166. Id.
167. See WooD, supra note 143, at 529-31 (discussing federalist division of power through
"concurrent jurisdiction" over local and national concerns). An influential spokesman of the
federalist view, James Wilson, offered the following description of the "general principle" that
the framers developed for the "drawing of the line" between the roles of the federal and the state
governments: "[W]hatever object was confirmed in its nature and operation to a particular State
ought to be subject to the separate government ofthe States; but whatever inits nature and operation extended beyond a particular State, ought to be comprehended within the federal jurisdiction." Statement ofJames Wilson in thePennsylvania ConventionNov.24,1787, in3FARRAND,
THERECORDS OF THEFEDERALCONVENTIONOF 1787, at 139-40 (MaxFerrand ed., 1911).
168. THE FEDERAUSTNO. 45, supranote 47, at 300.
169. See KERMrTL. HAL, THE MAGIC MRRoR: LAWiNAMERIcANHIsTORY 89(1989)

(explaining Congress's desire to intervene in private markets and its use of law as "an instrument
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mg intractability of the sectional conflict that plagued antebellum America,
however, the federal role in the national economy largely evaporated soon
after the Gibbons decision. 7 °

The national legislature's withdrawal from economic regulation did not
simply reflect the political constraints of sectionalism. It flowed from an ideological shift as well. Led by the Jacksonian "revolution," 7 ' Americans came
to believe that markets were best "regulated" by competition among private
actors. 1 72 Government regulation of markets thus fell into disfavor during the
antebellum era. When such regulation proved necessary, moreover, the Amer-

was for state control rather than control by the national govican preference
173
ernment.
While this antebellum political settlement might have disappointed some
of the more ardent nationalists of the federalist persuasion, 174 it did not offend

federalist constitutionalism. Publius had argued that the working balance of
regulatory power between nation and state would reflect the evolving policy
preferences ofthe people. 7S In addition, Publius predicted that "the first and

most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their
to promote private economic enterprise"). The creation of a commercial unity on a national scale
was an important federalist goal in creating a viable national government under the Constitution.
See generally Tim FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1941)
(discussing varying positions of federal regulation oftrade).
170. See HALT, supra note 169, at 90, 92 (detailing controversies of federal regulation
and eventual decline in federal legislation involving economic entities). The federal withdrawal from its engagement with the national economy is best symbolized by President Andrew
Jackson's veto in 1832 of Congress's legislation to reauthorize the Bank of the United States.
See MARIiN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: PoLrrIcs & BEUEFs 10-13 (1957)

(discussing Jacksonian movement against "Monster Bank" of United States). The federal withdrawal was not total, however. For example, in 1852, Congress enacted its first major
regulatory statute, which addressed the safety of steamboat operations. HALT, supra note 169,
at93.
171. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THBE VINEYARD OFLIBERTY320-24 (1982) (chronicling Jackson's presidential campaign against John Quincy Adams).
1836-1937,at 80(1991).
,AMPENIERPRIsEANDAbmEcANLAW,
172. HERBERTHovE
173. See HAL, supra note 169, at 94 (describing pre-Civil War trend of reserving economic regulation to states). The antebellum timeline of state regulation resembled that of Congress. After a brief flourishing of state regulation early in the nineteenth century, those efforts
subsided in the wake of the Panic of 1837. Id. at 94-96.
174. Chief among those, undoubtedly, would have been Alexander Hamilton, who believed
it important to tap the full potential of the federal government to promote the cause of nation
building. See ELKUS & MCKIrRICK, supra note 56, at 92-114 (reviewing background and
political beliefs of Hamilton).
175. See TlE FEDERAl=NO. 46, supra note 34, at 305 (explaining that "sentiments and
sanction" of constituents were likely to be factor in government action); supra notes 139-51 and
accompanying text (explaining Publius' view of relationship between national government, state

governments, and people).
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respective states."'" It hardly is surprising that this would remain so in the
"underdeveloped society"'" of deTocqueville's America, which was characterized by "small towns and rural life."11 3 In this social context, the McCulloch/Gibbons conception of congressional regulatory power had become
politically unusable, and thus constitutionally dormant.
The hostile environment for federal regulation began to change after the
Civil War. The small-scale economy ofthe antebellum era yielded to an evertion came the
increasing process of industrialization. 179 With in tl
development of large-scale economic enterprises,' and with them, a host of
Many Americans saw the rise of the "huge new compasocial problems.'

nies" in the late nineteenth century as "unnatural," and "alarming."'8

As the antebellum understanding would have it, the first regulatory responses to the problems associated with the new industrialism came from the
state legislatures.' 83 Yet, Publius had also predicted that the people's preference for regulatory decision making at the state level would change if "manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration" developed at the national
level.' Such proofs developed with the realization that the individual states
could not adequately control enterprises that had created a transcontinental
176.

TEE EDERALSTNO. 46, supranote 34, at 305.

177. See MORToNi.HoRwrzTBETRANFORMATIONOFAMmCANLAW, 1780-1860, at
111 (1977) (explaining economic background ofnineteenth century America).
178. HAI, supra note 169, at 87. It was not until 1850 that the value of goods manufac.tured in the United States exceeded that of agricultural produce. Id.at 88.
179. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CoNSTITUTION 117 (1987) (explaining
shifts to large-scale enterprise and ensuing constitutional questions).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 118-19 (listing social problems associated with industrialized society, such
as overcrowding, unemployment, poverty, and inequalities in bargaining power); MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 160, at 102-03 (noting environment of concern that collective welfare might be

harmed by spread of capitalism if not controlled by government).
182. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 77 (1984). Professor McCraw
summarized the perceived "novel and alarming practices" of these firms as follows:
[D]egredation of human labor in such industries as steel (where immigrant laborers
put in 72-hour workweeks); unscrupulous manipulation of stocks and bonds in
industries such as railroads and utilities (where "frenzied finance" seemed common); and abrupt losses of community control, not only over industries but over
individual center firms, whose resources often dwarfed those of city and even state
governments.
Id.
183.

Cox, supra note 179, at 119; see also Arnold M. Paul, Legal ProgressMsm, the

Courts, and the Crisisofthe 1890s,in AMERICANLAW AND THE CONSITUI ONAL ORDER 283,

283-84 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978) (listing state movements in
areas of antitrust and labor abuses).
184. THE FEDERAUST NO. 46, supra note 34, at 306.

1244

57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1213 (2000)

system of railroads, had organized on a national scale, and had developed an
increasingly interdependent national economy.' Congress responded legislatively to this diagnosis of state regulatory failure. 18 6 The most prominent and
the most suggestive congressional legislative actions of this era were the
Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887,187 which established the first
modem federal regulatory agency in an attemptto control the railroads, and the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1 8 9 0 ,'s which outlawed monopolies and various
anti-competitive practices. In these legislative efforts, Congress relied on the
regulatory framework provided by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clauses and thus, on Gibbons/McCulloch. The legislation also
inevitably sharpened the political and constitutional controversy concerning
the authority ofthe federal government to control capitalism ' 9
A. The FormalistTurn
Congress's forays into regulatory action were met with judicial resistance. The congressional initiative required the Court to rethink the McCullochlGibbons approach to the federalism limits on congressional regulatory
power, as well as the federalist understanding of federalism on which that
approach was grounded. The result was a redefinition of congressional power
along exclusively formalistic grounds. The justices returned to Gibbons,
eliminated Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, and limited Congress's regulatory authority to legislation that fit precisely the factual dynamic of the case.
Stripped to those essentials, Gibbons simply had allowed Congress to authorize steamboats to enter the navigable waterways ofthe states notwithstanding
local regulatory barriers to that entry. Reconstructed this way, Gibbons had
done no more and no less than to legitimate congressional regulations that
facilitated movement in the "streams" of interstate commerce.
The restrictive core ofthe Court's formalized approach to the commerce
power emerged early on, whenthejustices in UnitedStatesv. E. C. Knight Co.'9
185. Cox,supranote 179, at 118-19;McCLOSKEY, supra note 160, at 102-03.
186. Congress did not embark on a wholesale takeover of state regulation. Instead, the
national legislators targeted their regulatory attention on enterprises that, because of the scope
of their activities, could not adequately be controlled by the states individually. McCRAW,
supra note 182, at 60-61.
187. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,24 Stat. 379 (1887) (repealed 1978) (current version
codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
188. Act of July 2,1890, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7
(1994)).
189. See COX, supra note 179, at 138-39 (noting numerous challenges to federalregulatory
intervention made by business enterprises); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 160, at 101-04 (detailing
conflicting interests between ownership of property and freedom of action).
190. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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largely disabled the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 91 In Knight, the government
sought to cancel a corporate acquisitionthat gave the American Sugar Refining
Company aninety-eightpercent share ofthe sugar-refining market inthe United
States."9 There can be little doubt that the Gibbons understanding of the
commerce power supported the constitutional reach ofthe Sherman Act to the
Sugar Trust. Sugar refining certainly fits within any common-sense meaning
of "commercial intercourse" - the Gibbons understanding of "commerce.,,93
Furthermore, it is an understatement that a virtually complete national monopoly "extend[s] to or affect[s] other states" - the Gibbonsunderstanding ofwhat
makes commerce interstate in character. 9 4 The Knight Court disagreed,
however, reasoning that the sugar-refining industry was one of manufacturing
1 95
and not one of"commerce. '

The Knight separation of manufacturing from commerce evoked the
rejected distinction in Gibbons between navigation and commerce."s Chief
Justice Marshall, following Publius, pointedly resisted resorting to any
artificially narrow definition of "commerce" that would compromise the
ability of Congress to reach activity that common sense placed within the web
of relationships that constituted international or interstate commerce."9 Chief
Justice Fuller, writing for the Knight majority, clearly indicated the formalist
reversal of the Marshall Court's more functional understanding of "commercel:
Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves
in acertain sense the control ofits disposition, but this is a secondary and
not the primary sense; and although the exercise of that power may result
in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and
191. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (holding commerce
power inapplicable to application of antitrust laws when acts of sugar company "indirectly
affected" trade or commerce). The Court simultaneously neutralized the Interstate Commerce
Commission Act as well. See Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective,

38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1212-15 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court decisions manifesting
"hostility" towards Interstate Commerce Commission). In Professor McCraw's summary, "the
federal judiciary, with the Supreme Court in the lead, sharply restricted the powers of the
[Interstate Commerce Commission] and reduced it, by the late 1890s, to a mere collector of
data." MCCRAW, supra note 182, at 62.
192.

Knight, 156 U.S. at 5,9.

193. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,189-90 (1824).
194. Id.at 194.
195. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.
196. During this formalist period, the Court eventually would equate "commerce" with
"trade," see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,303 (1936), the very equation Chief Justice
Marshall rejected in Gibbons. See supra notes 117-23 and-accompanying text
197. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's

"common-sense" construction of constitutional text, as advocated by Hamilton).
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affects it onlyincidentallyandindirectly. Conmerce succeedstormanufacture, and is not part of it. s

Having excised sugar refining from the definition of "commerce," the Court
was free to deploy McCullochlGibbonsin the unaccustomed role of denying

congressional power. Because it was not classified as "commerce," sugar
refining was unreachable by Congress, regardless of the inevitability or the
extent of its "indirect" effect on interstate commerce. 199 The Knight departure
from the federalist understanding lay in the unnatural, overly formalistic

meaning the Court ascribed to commerce, I should emphasize, and not in the
formal restriction on congressional power that resulted from the finding that
Congress had regulated a noncommercial activity.
The Court complimented this intensified, formalistic limitation of the
activity that qualified as "commerce" with an acceptance of congressional

regulatory authority over activity the justices visualized as within a "stream"
or "current" of interstate commerce.2' ° In Staffordv. Wallace,"' for example,
the Court allowed congressional regulation of stockyards that held livestock
shipped from out of state for eventual sale or shipment to customers in other

states.2" Because the stockyards were "buta throat through which the current
[of interstate commerce] flows,e 20 3 they were "a part of interstate commerce"
198. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,12 (1895).
199. Id. at 16. As the Court explained, "That which belongs to commerce is within the
jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the
jurisdiction ofthe police power of the State." Id. at 12.
Only Justice Harlan, in dissent, retained the federalist sensibility that had shaped the
McCullochlGibbonsunderstanding of congressional power. He wrote:
To the general government has been committed the control of commercial intercourse among the States, to the end that it may be free at all times from any restraints except such as Congress may impose or permit for the benefit of the whole
country. The common government of all the people is the only one that can adequately deal with a matter which directly and injuriously affects the entire commerce of the country, which concerns equally all the people of the Union, and
which, it must be confessed, cannot be adequately controlled by any one State. Its
authority should not be so weakened by construction that it cannot reach and
eradicate evils that, beyond all question, tend to defeat an object which that government is entitled, by the Constitution, to accomplish.
Id. at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
200. For a discussion of the origins of the stream-of-commerce doctrine, see David
Gordon, Swift & Co. v. United States: The Beef Trustand the Stream of Commerce Doctrine,
28 AM . LEGALHIST. 244,275-79 (1984). For an analysis ofthe doctrine during the formalist
period, see Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce

Doctrinefrom Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAML. RXV. 105,108-27 (1992).
201. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
202. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495,528 (1922).
203. Id.at516. The Court noted that "[t]he object to be secured by the act is the free and
unburdened flow of livestock." Id. at 514. This notation was significant because it helped
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and thus within congressional power.2'
The levee that separated the congressionally regulable activity in the
streams of interstate commerce from the local activity on land was permeable,
but only slightly so. In The Shreveport Rate Cases, 2 the Court upheld the
federal government's power to regulate the rates on an intrastate rail route in
an effort to prevent discrimination against the rates for interstatecarriage.2es
In Knight, of course, the Court had blocked Congress from addressing a local
activity (sugar refining) despite its effect on interstate commerce (the buying
and selling of refined sugar), because that effect, by definition, was deemed
indirect. In Shreveport, by contrast, the justices allowed Congress to reach
the local activity (the intrastate rates) because its effect on interstate commerce (the interstate routes) was deemed direct. The Shreveport Court
explained the finding of directness by characterizing the congressional regulation as one that, in effect; controlled the rail carriers themselves as "instruments of interstate commerce":
[Congress's]authority, extending to these interstatecarriersas instruments ofinterstatecommerce,necessarilyembracesthe rightto control their
operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to
interstatetrafficthatthe controlis essential or appropriateto the security of
thattraffic, to the efficiency oftheinterstate service, andtothe maintenance
of conditions underwhichinterstate commerce maybe conducted-uponfair
terms andwithoutmolestationorhindrance.... Wherevertheinterstateand
intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government ofthe
one involves the control ofthe other, it is Congress, and not the State, that
distinguish Stafford from Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). In Hammer, the Court
invalidated an act of Congress that barred the transportation in interstate commerce of products
manufactured by child labor. Id. at 269-72. Although this regulation applied within the stream
of commerce, it imposed, rather than removed, a barrier to the flow of goods. Id. at 269-70.
The law thus did not fit the Gibbons model, as reconstructed, and became suspect Id. at 27176. The Court in Stafford reafirmed the Hammer limitation, noting that the "very essence" of
Congress's commerce power was to ensure that the "streams of commerce... are ever flowing."
Stafford,258 U.S. at 519.
204. Stafford,258 U.S. at 516. The transactions that occurred at the stockyards, the Court
found, could "not be separated from the movement to which they contribute and necessarily take
on its character." Id. The Court also noted that the stockyards Congress had regulated were
"not a place of rest or final destination." Id.at 515.
The Court distinguished Stafford inA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

U.S. 495, 543 (1935), when it invalidated federal regulation of a slaughterhouse that processed
poultry mostly from out of state, but then sold to local customers. Id. at 542-51. Because "the
flow in interstate commerce had ceased," the sales and operations of the slaughterhouse were
not "transactions in interstate commerce." Id. at 543. Unlike the stockyards in Stafford, which
received livestock from out of state and returned them to interstate commerce, the poultry in
Schechter "had come to a permanent rest within the State." Id.
205. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
206. Houston, E. &W. Tex Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,350-55 (1914).
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is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress
would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the
State,
27
and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field. 0

The Shreveport decision is best seen as a limited exception to Knight.
Although the Court allowed Congress some authority to reach local activity,
it did so onlythrough the Knight-visionof Gibbons. The keyto Shreveportwas

the Court's recognition of Congress's authority over railroads as "the common
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse. "2a' That
authority enabled Congress to control the carriers "as instruments of interstate
commerce," and to prevent them from using their "intrastate operations" to

harm activity "within the national field."1209 At bottom, the justices in Shreve-

port simply vindicated the authority of Congress to ensure that interstate
carriers "keep the highways of interstate conmunication open to interstate
traffic upon fair and equal terms" with their local operations.1 ° So viewed,
Shreveport fitthe Gibbons fact pattern. It was the tight interrelationship ofthe
local rates and the interstate rates on rail lines, which operated locally as well

as interstate, that converted a local, commercial activity into a matter of national concern.
The Shreveport Court had eased Knight's formalism only
2 11
slightly.
As the Stafford and Shreveport decisions demonstrate, the early modem
Court was hardly a single-minded foe of federal regulation.212 Yet, in Knight,

the doctrinally dominant decision ofthis era, the Court made clear that it had
207.

Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 353.
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 353-354.
The Court in Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925),

followed the Shreveportexception to Knight. In Coronado,the Court upheld application of the
Sherman Antitrust Act to a strike against mine operators. Id at 310. Although mining, like the
sugar refining in Knight, is a local activity, the purpose of the strike, like the purpose of the
discriminatory local rail rates in Shreveport,was to harm interstate commerce. Id.
The Court emphasized the continuing vitality of Knight formalism, and the limited nature
of the Shreveportand Coronadoexceptions, in Carterv. CarterCoalCo., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

In Carter,the Court invalidated a federal statute that imposed, among other things, certain labor
regulations on coal mining operations. Id. at 289-310. Following Knight,the Court classified
mining as "production," not "commerce." Id. at 300-01, 303. Accordingly, although the Court
"feely granted" that coal mining operations affect interstate commerce, the Court discounted
that effect as "indirect," and thus outside the regulatory reach of Congress. Id. at 307-08. The
Carter Court clarified the formalism of the relationship inquiry. "[T]he matter of degree has
no bbaring upon the question here, since that question is not - What is the extent of the local
activity or condition, or the extent of the effect produced upon interstate commerce? But What is the relation between the activity or condition and the effect?" Id. at 308.
212. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTunON IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTLYRY, 1888-1986, at 4-5 (1990).
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lost its balance. The justices retained the formalism of the McCullochlGibbons understanding by holding Congress to the constraints imposed by the
Constitution's enumeration of powers.213 In doing so, they remained focused
on the important federalism value of protecting the governmental integrity of
the states. 2 4 They ignored, however, the counterbalancing, teleological
fimctionalism2 s of the Marshall Court's foundational decisions. Within the
formal confines ofthe enumerated powers, Chief Justice Marshall consistently
rejected artificial barriers to the accomplishment of Congress's constitutional
responsibilities. InGibbons, the Marshall Court made clear that a balanced
federalism must accommodate a power in Congress to regulate activities that,
as a matter of common sense, are a part ofinterstate commerce. In its overriding dedication to preserve a meaningful governmental role for the states in a
quickly changing society, the early modem Court threatened to rob Congress
of any meaningful role in addressing the national economy. Congress, to be
sure, could act within the "streams of commerce" to keep them "ever flowing,'216 but the national legislature was left powerless to address the myriad
of activities, clearly economic in nature, on which that flow ultimately depended.
Thus, the early modem Court had transformed federalism into a purely
formalistic division of regulatory authority between the nation and the states
grounded on an unworkably narrow conception of commerce among the
states.217 This division safeguarded state prerogative, but it ignored the
Marshall Court's central premise that legal conceptions of congressional
power must make functional sense, allowing Congress to play its constitutional role as a national legislature. This division also ignored the reality of
a modem national economy. The early modem Court's thoroughly formalist
understanding of federalism could not stand.
B. The FunctionalResponse
By the early 1930s, the Stock Market Crash of 1929 had produced a
devastating, nationwide economic crisis.218 The political reaction to the Great
Depression included a transfer of government in the 1932 election, with the
213. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at291; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,11-13
(1895).
214. See, e.g., ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935);
Knight, 156 U.S. at 13.
215. See supra note 3 (discussing characteristics offuinctionalism).
216. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495,519 (1922).
217. This formalistic division is known as "dual federalism." Cox, supranote 179, at 13855; HOVENKAMP, supranote 172, at 79-81.
218. For a description of this period, see JAMES MAcGREGOO, BURNS, THE AMERICAN
ExPERPMENT: THE WORKsHOP oF DEMOCRACY 539-59 (1985).
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national electorate removing the Republican Party from its long-standing posi-

tion of control over Congress and the White House. 9 Franklin Roosevelt and
the newly resurgent Democrats assumed power in 1933, and within the First

Hundred Days the New Deal Congress, working under President Roosevelt's
leadership, enacted fifteen major regulatory statutes." In the summer of
1935, again prodded by President Roosevelt, Congress followed with another
ambitious set of regulatory laws inthe Second Hundred Days.? Virtually all

of this legislation, however, was constitutionally problematic under the formalistic doctrine the early modem Court had devised in its effort to control the
regulatory power of Congress.'

In the early tests of the New Deal legislation, the Court held to its formalist line and invalidated virtually every part of the federal recovery program
that came to its attention.m In the economic and social catastrophe of the
Great Depression, however, the manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors throughout the country had been especially hard hit? 4 To hold, as Knight
and its progeny dictated, that such matters were local, noncommercial, and
outside the reach of Congress' proved to be untenable and unacceptable. 6
219. For a description of the election, see Frank Freidel, Election of1932, in TEE COMING
TO PowmE: CRiTCAL PRESmmTIAL ELECTIONS INAMmICAN HISTORY 322 (Arthur MK
Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1971).
220. See W .LAME. LEUCHTENBURG RAN ND.ROOELTANDThENEWDEAL41-62
(1963).
221. Id. at 143-66.
222. Cox, supra note 179, at 147-48.
223. The following cases struck downNew Deal legislation on Commerce Clause grounds:
Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating price-fdng and labor regulations of
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); A.L.A_ Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (invalidating regulations of hours and wages in slaughterhouses promulgated
pursuant to National Industrial Recovery Act); R.R.Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330
(1935) (invalidating Railroad Retirement Act). The Court also invalidated congressional
legislation in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Adjustment
Act on taxing and spending power grounds), and inPanamaRefiningCo. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935) (invalidating § 9(c) of National Industrial Recovery Act on nondelegation grounds). The
exception to the early judicial resistance to the New Deal came in Norman v. Baltimore& Ohio
RR Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding validity of Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, ch. 49,
48 Stat. 112, abolishing gold standard, on gold clauses grounds).
224.
See BURNS, supra note 218, at 543-44 (discussing impact of Depression on agricultural and manufacturing sectors); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause andthe NationalEconomy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 664-65 (1946) (discussing impact of Depression on
mining sector).
225. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
226. For an exploration ofthe political controversy generated by the Court's constitutional
resistance to the New Deal, centering on President Roosevelt's "Court-Packing Plan," see WLLIAME.LEUCHmNBURG, TBE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONsTiTUniONALREVOLuInoN
]N THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-162 (1995).
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The justices - and their formalistic doctrine - had to yield. 1
And yield they did, in the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937." ' The
essence ofthe "revolution! was the Court's replacement of the formalism that
had dominated the federalism doctrine of the early modem era with a thor-

oughly functional approach to congressional power.'

The first retreat came

in NLRB v. Jones & LaughlinSteel Corp.,10 when the Court upheld an important component of the Second Hundred Days, the National Labor Relations

Act of 1935." 1 The National Labor Relations Board created by that Act

charged the steel company with an unfair labor practice for its firing of

employees who attempted to organize a union"

The constitutional rub was

that these employees had worked in one of Jones & Laughlin's manufacturing

facilities, an activity that Knight had removed from Congress's commerce

power." s The government responded with an attempt to position the case
under Stafford. 4 With Jones & Laughlin vertically integrated on a national
scale, the manufacturing facility, in the government's view, functioned as the
"focal point" in a stream of commerce." Because "industrial strife" at the
facility "would cripple the entire movement" of the company's goods, the
government depicted the Act's labor regulations, at least as applied to Jones
& Laughlin, as an effort to remove a potential barrier to the interstate "flow"

of commerce.

6

The company, in turn, sought to distinguish Stafford on the

ground that manufacturing was not simply a holding pen, as were the stock-

yards in that case, but a transformative process: what flowed into the plant
227. As W'lliam. Luchtenburg observed, "[t]he Great Depression presented the necessity
for government action with a special urgency, and when even then the Justices resisted, their
fate was sealed." Id. at 236.
228. Id. at 213-36. For a revisionist view challenging the timing, if not the fact, of a
"constitutional revolution" in the Court's approach to the regulatory power of Congress, see
generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
229. The revolution included not only a move from formalism to functionalism with respect
to the federalism limits on congressional regulatory power, but also a similar shift with respect
to the substantive due process limits on the power of states to enact economic and social regulation. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (holding that "regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is
due process").
230. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
231. See Act of July 5, 1935, 74th Cong., lst Sess., ch. 372,49 Stat 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1994)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 36-41 (1937) (holding that effect of labor disputes on steel industry triggered Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
232. Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
233. Id. at 34.
234. Id. at 34-36; see also supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing Stafford).
235. Jones& Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 34-35.
236. Id. at 35-36.
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(raw materials) was not what flowed out (finished products). In this view,
Jones & Laughlin's manufacturin plant was not a harbor in the stream, but
a local land mass that stood between, and outside, two separate streams.'
The point/counterpoint of the stream of commerce argument in Jones &
Laughlin vividly demonstrated the formalist game of struggling to place a
regulated activity within one (Knight) or another (Stafford) legal category.
The "revolution" the justices instigated in the case accompanied their announcement that they no longer would play that game. The Court found it
unnecessary to unravel the arguments from Knight and Stafford because
"congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and
obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an
essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce." 8 With this tack,
the Court reached back to another of the early modem precedents, Shreveport,
which allowed Congress to regulate the local, commercial activities of interstate carriers if those activities had "a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic." 9 In doing so, the Jones & Laughlin Court transformed that
limited exception to the KnightlStafford dichotomy into the foundation for a
new and functional doctrinal construct.
The Court began on the familiar terrain of Shreveport. Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the majority, announced: "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, iftheyave such a close and
substantialrelation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."'24 The essence of the
Jones & Lauglin transformation was the Court's measuring of the "relation"
between the local activity and interstate commerce by the extent ofthe "effect"
the former had on the latter.24 ' Given the "far-flung activities" of Jones &
Laughlin2 42 and the size and importance of the steel industry,243 Chief Justice
Hughes thought it "obvious" that a labor strike at the manufacturing plant
would have an "immediate" and "most serious effect upon interstate commerce."124 It was that effect which enabled Congress's commerce power.24
237.
238.
239.
206 and
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 36.
Id.
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,351 (1914); supra note
accompanying text
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (emphasis added).
Id. at 40; see also id. at 41-43.
Id.at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 41. Indeed, the ChiefJustice believed the effect might prove "catastrophic." Id.
Id. at 43.
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The Court's focus in Jones & Laughlin on the actual effect of a regulated
activity on interstate commerce, rather than on the logical or juridical relationship between the activity and commerce, reversed the early modem understanding.2 " In Jones & Laughlin, it was "the effect upon commerce, not the
source of the injury, which is the criterion" that governed Congress's regulatory authority.247 Eschewing the "intellectual vacuum2 48 of the early modem
precedent, Chief Justice Hughes in Jones & Laughlin approached interstate
commerce as "a practical conception."249 Refusing 'to shut [their] eyes to the
plainest facts of our national life,"" the Court measured the effect of a
regulated activity on commerce in the light of "actual experience.""
With its embrace of functionalism, the Jones & Laughlin Court did not
intend to abandon meaningful limits on congressional regulatory power. As
had Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons, 2 the Court emphasized that the
Commerce Clause itself signified that the framers had withheld some measure
of regulatory power from Congress. 3 Early in his opinion, Chief Justice
Hughes made this limitation clear.
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an
extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause establishes, between commerce "among the states" and the internal concerns of
a State. That distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system_.
Rather than drop the federalism limits on the commerce power, the Court
sought to functionalize them. Chief Justice Hughes explained the new approach.
Undoubtedlythe scope of [the commerce] power mustbe considered inthe
light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, inview of our complex society, would effectually obliterate
the distinctionbetweenwhatis national andwhatis local and create a completelycentralizedgovermment. The questionisnecessarilyoneofdegree.2
246. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text (discussing E.C. Knight's rejection
ofMcCullochGibbons understanding of commerce power).
247. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937).
248.
d. at41.
249. Id. at 41-42.
250. Id. at 41.
251. Id.at42.
252. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824) (delineating bounds of
congressional power under commerce clause).
253. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1937) (describing
distinction between local and national spheres under commerce clause).
254. Id. at30.
255. Id. at37.
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After Jones & Laughlin, the Court no longer required that an activity which
affected interstate commerce be local or noncommercial. 6 The measure of
directness was not definitional, as it had been in the early modem era. The new
functional orientation evaluated effect as a matter of "degree," based on the
real-world impact of a regulated activity on interstate commerce. 7 Within
several years, the Court in Wickardv. Filburn"8 reduced the Jones & Laughlin
analysis to a constitutional test of whether the activity Congress sought
to
259
regulate exerted a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."1
The Court's switch in Jones & Laughlin led to a thoroughly functional
reconstruction of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the post-New Deal
period. The justices were solicitous of the need for an effective national
regulatory power, but as will be seen, they grew increasingly tone-deaf to the
complimentary need for meaningful constitutional limits on the reach of that
power." ° Such was not the immediate meaning ofJones & Laughlin,in which
the justices had exhibited a concern for limits. After all, a crucial determinant
in that decision was the undeniable centrality of steel manufacturing, at Jones
& Laughlin and generally within the industry, to the national economy. But,
at least in retrospect, it seems clear that a functional imbalance inevitably
followed from the essentially single-minded focus on "economic effects" in
the Jones & Laughlin analysis.26
Jones & Laughlinpresents a mirror image ofKnight. In Knight,the Court
drained the functionalism from the federalist understanding of the commerce
power, retaining only its formalism.6 2 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court revived
the functionalism ofthe early foundational cases, but in doing so, it established
a framework that left no room for the formal constraints of the enumerated
powers doctrine. In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall's first step in defining the
Commerce Clause was to define "commerce" as the subject matter within
Congress's regulatory power.2 63 The constitutional mistake of the Knight
regime was to unnaturally tighten that formal limit on congressional power.
But with the Jones & Laughlin focus on the effect, rather than on the nature of
256.

See supra notes 266-78 and accompanying text (explaining functional interpretation

of commerce clause).
257.
258.
259.
260.

Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,125 (1942).
See infra notes 266-79 and accompanying text (describing Court's deference to Con-

gress in regulating interstate commerce).
261.
Wickard,317 U.S. at 124.
262. See supranotes 190-99 and accompanying text (explaining formalistic approach used
in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.1 (1859)).
263. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,189-93 (1824) (stating meaning of commerce); supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (describing Court's definition of commerce
in Gibbons).
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a regulated activity, the subject-matter limitation entirely disappeared. As the
Court made clear in Wickard, it no longer mattered whether the activity Congress sought to regulate could be categorized as "commerce," as long as it
carried the requisite effect on interstate commerce.2 "
The partial incorporation of Gibbonsinto the Jones &Laughlinreformulation of Commerce Clause doctrine would ultimately threaten the post-New
Deal consensus. With Jones & Laughlin'selimination of all traces of formality from Commerce Clause analysis, the efficacy of the federalism limits on
congressional regulatory power rides entirely on the functional effect of the
regulated activity on interstate commerce. In a "highly interdependent society" like the modem United States, however, the limiting potential of an
exclusive focus on effects is chimerical.' To make matters worse, the postNew Deal Court deployed the logic of Jones & Laughlin to weaken the
doctrine of Jones & Laughlin,making it even more difficult for the effect test
to shoulder the burden of federalism limits on its own.
The implications of Jones & Laughlin for meaningful limits on Congress's commerce power began to sharpen into view with the Court's decision
in UnitedStates v. Darby."e Just as the Jones & Laughlin Court had revived
the effect test of Gibbons,2 6 Darbyre-acknowledged Gibbons'sacceptance of
Congress's "plenary power"' to regulate freely within the boundaries ofthe
Commerce Clause. Thus, the Darby Court recognized equal power in Congress to open and to close the streams of interstate commerce, as the legislators
deem appropriate." 9 The justices also disclaimed any intention to secondguess Congress's motive, purpose, or policy preference when regulating
interstate commerce. 0 These once again became matters for 'the legislative
judgment" and not for the courts. 1 Accordingly, the Wickard Court added,
264.

Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119-25. In Wickard, the Court described the regulated activity

at issue as "production [of wheat] not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm." Id. at 118. The Court explained: "[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to
nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce." Id.at 120.
265. BEER, supra note 1, at 124-25.
266. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938).
267. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97 (explaining effect test); supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing bounds on congressional power delineated in Gibbons).
268. Darby,312 U.S. at 115.
269. See id. at 113-15 (explaining deference to legislative judgment). The Darby Court
explicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-17;
see also supra note 203 (discussing Hammer).
270. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 114-15 (explaining policy of legislative deference).
271. Id.at 115; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129(1942) (deferring to legis-

lature).
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"restraints' 1272 on Congress's use of its commerce power "must proceed from

political rather than from judicial processes." 2"

The Darby acceptance ofthe commerce power as a congressionalpower
induced the justices to view Commerce Clause issues from a congressional
perspective. The adoption of that perspective, while itself consistent with
Gibbons, had two important doctrinal consequences. The first was the socalled aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn. According to that principle, the Court allows congressional regulation to reach any individual whose
effect on interstate commerce, while '"ivial by itself,"27 4 is substantial when
"taken together with that of many others similarly situated."27" The aggregation principle encourages the justices to assess a regulatory problem as Congress sees it. When Congress legislates, it does so by delineating general rules
that apply similarly to those who are similarly situated. Legislatures do not
focus on individuals but on categories of individualsY 6 When Congress
decides to regulate an activity because of its effect on interstate commerce, it
measures that effect in the aggregate, not in each individual application. The
aggregation principle thus allows the Court to apply the effect test with a
functional recognition that the Commerce Clause is a legislative power that
authorizes Congress to use legislative judgment.
The justices' appreciation that they are reviewing a legislative judgment
ultimately counseled a considerable deference when they reviewed congressional exercises of the commerce power. The second doctrinal consequence
of the Court's adoption of a congressional perspective with respect to the
Commerce Clause followed. In upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964,vl the
Court stepped back from determining, on its own, whether the activity Congress had regulated triggered a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 1278 The justices limited themselves to asking whether Congress had
"a rational basis" for so finding. 27
272. Wickard,317U.S. at l21.
273. Id. at 120.
274. Id. at 127.
275. Id. at 127-28. In Perezv. UnitedStates, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the Court restated the
aggregation doctrine as follows: "Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual
instances' ofthe class." Id. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,193 (1968)).
276. See generally Bi-MetallieInv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441
(1915) (discussing legislation by categories of individuals).

277.

42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).

278. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,125 (1942).
279. See Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964) (finding
that only concern for Court is that Congress had rational basis for law and employed reasonable
means to achieve that end); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,303-04 (1964) (stating that
Court's function is to determine whether Congress has rational basis for regulation).
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Both the aggregation principle and the rational basis test are modifications of Jones & Laughlin. In upholding the labor act's application to the
steel company, the Court satisfied itself ofthe effect on commerce, measured
from the perspective of Jones & Laughlin's manufacturing facility, not of all
employers nationwide." ° Although an amendment, the aggregation principle
flows from the Jones & Laughlin Court's adoption of a functional and realistic
understanding of congressional power. Congress must legislate generally by
category, not ad hoc by individual. The rational basis test, on the other hand,
does not fit quite so comfortably with Jones & Laughlin. If the substantiality
limit articulated in Jones & Laughlin is to be a meaningfid constitutional
constraint, is it not necessary for the justices to make their own decision on
the requisite "degree" of an activity's effect on interstate commerce? The
Court's move to a more deferential posture, although in tension with Jones &
Laughlin's concern for meaningful limits on congressional power, nevertheless followed from the essential meaning of the "Constitutional revolution of
1937. u281 In overturning the early modem jurisprudence, the justices decided
to withdraw from the national political process and to allow Congress to
assume the unchallenged lead in deciding which issues require a national
regulatory response.'
With this new stance, however, the post-New Deal Court simply traded
one form of imbalance for another. The thoroughgoing functionalism of the
post-New Deal settlement allowed Congress to fulfill its constitutional role,
but it could not simultaneously hold the national legislature within that role.
The Court revived the functionalist dimension of the federalist conception of
federalism but disregarded the role of formalism in securing a healthy balance
in the jurisprudence. Having reversed the overriding and overbearing formalism of the early modem era, 'thie Court could find no stopping place short of
abdication. "ss 3 Federalism lost its legal dimension.2 4

280. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937) (analyzing
effects of statute upon Jones & Laughlin and entire steel industry).
281. See supra note 229.
282. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120, 129 (stating willingness to defer to legislative
judgment).
283. MCCLOSKEY, supranote 160, at 178.
284. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing formalist approach inMarbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). Professor Samuel Beer emphasized that "American
federalism is at once a system of law and a structure of power." BEER, supra note 1, at 23. Yet,
writing in 1963, Professor Charles Black in reviewing the jurisprudence governing the federalism limits on congressional power, noted, "[tlhe issue... is whether the federal system has
any legal substance, any core of constitutional right that courts will enforce." CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES INCONSTmmnONAL LAW 30 (1963).
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lIf. The ContemporarySearchfor Balance

The post-New Deal settlement allowed the Court to embrace, in the
justices' ownphrase, a "broad and sweeping" commerce power in Congress.2 85
The breadth of that power served the functional goal of enabling Congress to
enact legislation commensurate with its constitutional responsibility to control
interstate commerce in the national interest. The sweeping nature of that
power, however, threatened to dissolve all legal constraints on Congress's
policy prerogative, and thus jeopardized the constitutional commitment to
federalism. ss
The finctional reaction of the post-New Deal Court to the formalism of
the early modem era represents an overreaction. Moreover, it exhibits two
sources of the discontent that have been associated with federalism jurisprudence for many years. First, it reflects the tendency ofthe Court, so prevalent
in its modem separation-of-powers jurisprudence, to over-rely on formal or
functional methodologies with respect to constitutional structure. The justices
tend to swing between those polar approaches, drawing on functionalism to
empower the political branches and on formalism to limit them. Second, the
Court's reaction highlights the incompleteness of either a purely formal or a
purely functional approach to constitutional structure. Each understanding
addresses but one dimension of structural issues. Only a balanced jurisprudence, one that integrates formal and functional components in the constitutional spirit of energetic yet limited government, will produce a healthy
approach to the separation ofpowers and federalism.
Although the search for balance has proved elusive with respect to separation of powers, appropriately balanced federalism jurisprudence has been
available since the foundational era of constitutional law. InMcCulloch and
in Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall delineated doctrine that reflects the federalist balance of the founding generation and that, even now, offers a model
with considerable promise for a Court that is rethinking the post-New Deal
settlement.' 7
Just as the Marshall Court laid the foundation of its approachto congressional regulatory power intwo decisions - the first inMcCulloch,with respect
to the necessary and proper power, and the second in Gibbons,with respect to
the commerce power - the current revision has come with a similar pairing.
285. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,305 (1964).
286. The height ofthe Court's hands-off approach, at least rhetorically, occurred in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (finding that Fair Labor Standards
Act, as applied to public mass transit authority, is within scope of congressional power under

Commerce Clause).
287. See supra notes 45-189 and accompanying text (discussing federalist limits in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1 (1824)).
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The first emerging line of decisions, like Gibbons, concerns the commerce
power. Beginning with United States v. Lopez'5 s and continuing through
United States v. Morrison,' 9 the Court's reformation of Commerce Clause
doctrine offers some hope that the justices may be intent on restoring the
federalist balance to federalism jurisprudence. The second emerging line of
decisions, like McCulloch, concerns the discretion of Congress to regulate
within the ambit of its enumerated powers. This second doctrinal line, with
Printz v. United States at its center, suggests the instability of the current
rethinking of federalism doctrine, as well as the possibility of a return to the
style of strict formalism that doomed the jurisprudence of the early modem
Court.' Yet, in Reno v. Condon, the Court recently cabined Printz, offering
hope that the Printz line of decisions will amount only to a limited exception
to an otherwise general renewal of the federalist design. I discuss the Lopez/

MorrisonandPrintz/Reno developments in turn.
A. LopezfMorrison
In Lopez, for the first time since the last hurrah of the early modem era
in 1936, the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress for exceeding the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause."' The culprit was the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,2 which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm in or
near a school. 3 InMorrison,the Court explicitly followed Lopez in holding
288. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
U.S.
289. United States v. Morrison,
290. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Printz crystallized and extended a prior
decision that had generated this second line of decision, New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). For a comparison ofPrintzand New York, see infra notes 427-45 and accompanying text
291.
See generallyUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating Gun
Free School Zones Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down price
fixing provisions of Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). Not surprisingly, the Lopez
decision has generated considerable commentary. See generally Ann Atthouse, Enforcing
FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996) (suggesting that Lopez
may signal return to federalism through Commerce Clause); Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the
Future ConstitutionalCrisis, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 825 (1996) (predicting that Lopez will cripple
Congress's ability to respond to national problems); Herbert Hovenkamp, JudicialRestraintand
ConstitutionalFederalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96
COLU. L. REV. 2213 (1996) (stating that Court is encroaching on state prerogatives); Symposium: The New FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (1996)
(sampling of different views ofLopez); Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94
MrCE. L. REV. 533 (1995) (collection of articles on effect of Lopez).
292.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1990).
293. See also § 922 (q)(2XA) (1994) (formerly § 922 (q)(1XA)) (making it unlawful for
"any individual [who) knowingly possess[es] a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
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that the civil remedy section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,19
which provided a federal cause of action for the victims of "crimes of violence
motivated by gender,"' exceeded Congress's commerce power.' In both
Lopez and Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion for
an identical and slim five-justice majority.'
The sense of occasion in Lopez was apparent in the rhetorical structure
of Chief Justice Rehmquist's majority opinion. Beginning with "first principles,"' his emphasis is revealing. Chief Justice Rehnquist began, as had
Chief Justice Marshall, with the doctrine of enumerated powers.' In doing
so, he emphasized the role of that doctrine in maintaining "a healthy balance
between the States and the Federal Government. ''300 Having completed the
prelude of first principles, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a narrative of Commerce Clause precedent that reached back to Gibbons.3"' At the conclusion
of that presentation, the Chief Justice offered a reconceptualization of Commerce Clause doctrine that he considered to be consistent with the "structure"
of the precedent.3" He began formally, by identifying "three broad'3categories
°3
of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's firsttwo categories embraced the lines of formalist doctrine that permitted congressional regulation during the early modem
era. The first category incorporated Stafford, allowing Congress to "regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce."3' The second category in294. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
295. Id. § 13981(c); see also id. § 13981(d)(1) (defining "motivated by gender"); id.
§ 13981(dX2) (defining "crime of violence").
296. See United States v. Morrison, _ U.S.__, 120 S. CL 1740,1748-54 (2000) (holding

that Violence Against Women Act exceeds scope of congressional power under Commerce
Clause).
297. The majority justices in each case included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens dissented
in each case.
298. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
299. Id. at 552-53; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,405 (1819).
300. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's introductory discussion, notwithstanding its invocation of the federalism goal of balance, nevertheless stressed the limits on congressional power. IM at 552. This
stress is understandable, perhaps, in light of the judicial neglect of limits in the post-New Deal

case law.
301. See id. at 553-58 (tracing history of commerce clause).
302. Id. at 558.
303. Id.
304. Id.; see also supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495(1922)). ChiefJustice Relnquistwith his citations to UnitedStatesv. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1942), and to beartof Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964),
seemed quite clearly to acknowledge Congress's plenary power over the channels of commerce.
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cluded Shreveport,allowing Congress to "regulate andprotect-the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."" 5 The third and
final ofthe Chief Justice's categories added the finctionalist doctrine of Jones
&Laughlin and Wickard: "Congress' commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relationto interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 3°
Chief Justice Rehnquist's definition of the third category reflects a
clarification, and perhaps a modification, of the post-New Deal effect test.
The clarification came with the Lopez Court's reminder that an activity's
effect on interstate commerce must be "substantial" in order to trigger Congress's commerce power. 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the inconsistency
of the post-1937 precedent on this point but concluded that "the proper test"
for the Commerce Clause required a showing of substantiality.s In making
this choice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist realigned the effect test with Jones &
39

Laughlin and Wickard.

310
The possible change reflected in the third category is more "elusive
and is more suggestive of the transformative potential of Lopez/Morrison. In
his reformulation of the effect test in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
mention the rational basis orientation of the Civil Rights Act precedent.3
Because the Chief Justice did not flag this change, as he had with respect to
the substantiality requirement, it is possible that the absence of rational basis
language was inadvertent. He included the rational basis component of the
effect test in his narrative of Commerce Clause precedent, and he did not
indicate any disagreement with that doctrine at the time.312 Yet, Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave every indication in Lopez that he intended his three categories

Thus, in the Lopez understanding, Congress would have equal power to open and close the
channels of commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see also supra notes 266-70 and accompanying
text (discussing Darby).
305. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see also supranotes 205-17 and accompanying text (discussing Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
306. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 240-51 and
accompanying text (describing Jones & Laughlin).
307. Id. at 558-59.
308. Id.
309. See supranotes 230-57 and accompanying text (explaining standard inJones&Laughlin). The four dissenting justices inLopez, however, would have preferred the adjective "significant" over "substantial," because the latter description "implies a somewhat narrower [commerce]
power than recent precedent suggests." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Morrison, 120 S. Ct at 1764 (Souter, I., dissenting).
311. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (noting rational basis test used to
evaluate Civil Rights Act).
312. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (mentioning rational basis test).
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of congressional commerce power to serve as a reformulated, three-part constitutional test. It is difficult to believe that his omission of the rational basis
component in the statement of that test reflected an oversight."' Moreover
and most suggestively, the Chief Justice, in stark contrast to the dissenting
opinions,314 did not use the rational basis test in his subsequent analysis of the
statute at issue in Lopez, even though that analysis centered exclusively on the
third category." 5 Indeed, he noted pointedly that the Court's evaluation of a
statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause is "independent,"3 16 an
assertion in severe tension3 1with
the high level of judicial deference that the
7
rational basis test registers.
The Court's subsequent decision inMorrisonstrengthens the suggestion
that the justices have abandoned the rational basis test. In Morrison, unlike
in Lopez, Congress had made a number of factual findings attempting to link
gender-motivated violent crimes to interstate commerce.318 In addition, at
least in the view ofthe four dissenting justices, inMorrison,again in contrast
to Lopez, Congress had presented "a mountain of data... showing the effects
of violence against women on interstate commerce." 319 Notwithstanding the
congressional findings and supporting evidence, the Court insisted on the
independence of its assessment of the effect of such acts of violence on
interstate commerce. 20 In Morrison as in Lopez, the majority analyzed the
"effect issue" without mentioning the rational basis test, while the dissenters
encased their
analysis supportive of the statutes in the deference prescribed
321
by that test.
Yet, notwithstanding these soundings from Lopez andMornson, neither
case provided a final test for the current vitality of rational basis deference.
As will be developed, the substantial effect analysis in both cases was dis313. It also is suggestive that the Court's restatement of the effect test later in the opinion
omits any reference to the rational basis filter. See id. at 560 ("Where economic activity sub-

stantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
314. See id. at 603-04 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
315.
316.

See id. at 559-68.
Id at 562.

317. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)
(noting that Court must defer to congressional finding if Congress had rational basis for its
actions).
318.

See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (stating findings of Congress); id. at 1759-64

(Souter, J.,
dissenting) (same).
319. Id at 1760 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
320. See id. at 1752 (stating that congressional findings alone are not sufficient to support
finding of burden on interstate commerce).
321. See id. at 1748-54 (deciding that violence does not impermissibly burden interstate
commerce); id. at 1759-64 (Souter, ., dissenting) (finding that violence against women substantially affects interstate commerce).
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abled atthe outset; because Congress had not regulated an economic or a commercial activity in either statute before the Court.32 Thus, the Court has had
no occasion, in Lopez or after, to evaluate a factual showing by Congress that
purports to link a regulated commercial activity with interstate commerce. It
is entirely possible that the Court, while maintaining the independence of its
reviewing role, nevertheless might hesitate in all but the clearest cases to
invalidate Congress's judgment with respect to the interstate impact ofregulation the justices accepted as truly commercial in nature. Such a "clearly
erroneous" middle ground between the near-complete deference of rational
basis scrutiny and the near-complete judicial takeover of de novo review
carries considerable promise for a balanced federalism jurisprudence. The
post-New Deal Court's recognition that the Commerce Clause is a congressional power was fully consistent with the federalist understanding. So too
was its sense that some measure of judicial modesty is appropriate in the
review of Congress's use of its authority. To summarize, it is clear that
Lopez/Morrison aligned contemporary doctrine with Jones & Laughlin by
reemphasizing the substantiality requirement of the effect test, and it is likely
that the justices also have dropped the rational basis dilution ofthat test. Even
with that reassertion ofjudicial authority, the Court may, and should, exhibit
considerable respect for congressional findings that link truly commercial
regulation to interstate commerce.
As an overall framework, the Lopez Court's categorization of Commerce
Clause analysis reflects the federalist intuition to bring "a healthy balance" to
federalism doctrine by integrating formal and functional methodologies. 3'
The initial categorization of Commerce Clause jurisprudence into three
doctrines provides a formal organization.324 Withinthat structure, the Court's
three doctrinal categories combine three lines of precedent, two formal and
one functional. The Court's recognition that each ofthe three categories provides Congress "broad" sources of regulatory power
offers an overall func3
tional counterweight to the formal organization. 2
The Court's integration of formal and functional elements penetrates its
approach to the crucial third category of the Lopez ftamework." The effect
test of that category is the fulcrum of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. On
one hand, Congress requires a broad, functional understanding of the test to
enable the regulation of subjects it must address in order to control interstate
commerce. On the other hand, an effective limit on this authority is necessary
322. See infra note 328 and accompanying text (discussing Court's requirement that regulated activity be commercial or economic in nature).
323. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.

324.

See id. at 558 (discussing three categories that impose burden on interstate commerce).

325.
326.

Id.
See id. at 559-68 (analyzing whether court could sustain statute under third category).
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to prevent Congress from converting its jurisdiction over interstate commerce
into a general regulatory power. The Lopez Court addressed this latter concern, in part, by tightening the functional limits on congressional power. The

Court recommitted to the substantiality requirement and in combination with
Morrison, likely eliminated the rational basis orientation of the effect test.
Lopez's most suggestive move in limiting congressional authority, however,
was in reintroducing a formal dimension to the effect analysis.

The Court in Lopez counterbalanced the thoroughgoing finctionalism of
the post-New Deal jurisprudence by requiring, as a threshold matter, that the

regulated activity be "economic" or "commercial" in nature.3 2 Lopez's
introduction of this formal element in the effect test completes the Court's

return to Gibbons, which the justices had begun in Jones & Laughlin. In the
post-New Deal decisions, the Court had only incorporated the functional
elements of the Marshall Court's approach to the Commerce Clause. By

reemphasizing that congressional regulation pursuant to that authority must
address subject matter within the category of "commerce," the Court finally
returned Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its original, federalist balance.32
The four dissenting justices in LopezlMorrison vigorously challenged the
majority's inclusion of the economic-or-commercial activity threshold as a
retuM to the formalism of the early modem era .3z The history of radical
mood-swinging that has characterized the Court's attention to issues of
separation of powers and federalism provide some basis for concern that
LopezlMorrisonmay reflect early steps toward a hardened formalism. Height-

ening this concern, the opinions of several of the justices who constitute the
majority in Lopez and Morrison include ominous references to traditional
spheres of authority - sometimes with respect to education or at other times
with respect to criminal law - that are constitutionally reserved to the states.3 '
327. See id. at 559-62 (discussing that Court found other statutes sustainable when pertaining to economic activity); id at 565-68 (deciding that firearm possession is not economic

but commercial activity).
328. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing how Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), adhered to federalist balance).
329. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1766-68 (Souter, I., dissenting) (explaining that majority's distinction between economic and non-economic activity privileges Court's view of federalism); id. at 1774-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (examining problems with distinction between
economic and non-economic activity); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (considering distinction to be return to "untenable jurisprudence from which Court extricated itself
almost 60 years ago"); id. at 627-28 (Breyer, 3., dissenting) (discussing case law that insists
determination of burden on interstate commerce must rest on practical considerations).
330. See, e.g.,Morrison, 120 S. CL at 1753 (suggesting that "other areas oftraditional state
regulation" would be open to congressional regulation); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n3 (explaining
that criminal law is generally under state authority); id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing concern over "tendency of this statute to displace state regulation in areas of traditional state concem").
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These references, which are troubling in their own right, might suggest an
ultimate likage between LopezlMorrison and Printz. In Printz, as I discuss
in the following section, the Court developed a purely formalistic restraint on
congressional power grounded on judicial notions of state sovereignty. 3 '
Assessing the scope of congressional power pursuant to Article I from
any list of legal categories over which the states possess a presumptive sovereignty, as the LopezlMorrison dissenters argue, threatens a return to failed
jurisprudential experiments of the past. 32 More fundamentally, such a stance
inverts the constitutional structure. The Constitution delineates the powers of
the national government, not those of the states. In the federalist scheme, the
United States possesses power over a number of specified "objects" of national concern, while the individual states remain as a land of regulatory
default, exercising authority over the undifferentiated remainder of governmental concerns.333 With respect to any congressional regulatory effort, the
appropriate question is whether the act falls within a constitutional power, not
whether the regulation affects some area traditionally under state control. 34
Such seems the clear import of the Supremacy Clause, which explicitly
privileges federal
laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution over any form
335
of state law.
Although the allusions to traditional areas of state sovereignty create
a troublesome echo of the early modem era, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Lopez and in Morrison, on the whole, reflect great caution to avoid
signaling any embrace of the thoroughgoing formalism of the early modem
era. Indeed, in Lopez he criticized that precedent for having "artificially...
331. See infra notes 371-446 and accompanying text (discussing how Printz seems to be
a step towards Court's early formalism).
332. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1772 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's
defining of congressional power by "categorical exceptions" is return to "near tragedy for
court"). The most prominent, recent example of the failure of federalism doctrine reasoned
from a set of sovereign authorities within states was short-lived. See generally Nat'l League
of Cities v. Usey, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In League of Cities, the Court disabled Congress from regulating

states "in areas of traditional government functions." Id. at 852. Later cases impressed the
Court with the difficulty of deploying the "traditional government functions" standard, and the
Court abandoned the effort by overruling League of Cities. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.

Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). The Court had become convinced that the "traditional government functions" test was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." Id.
at 546-47.
333. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional division between
state and federal power).
334. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct at 1768-72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing disapproval
of state sovereignty as principle limiting commerce power).
335. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, §1, cL 2.
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constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. "'1 6 It
is revealing in this light that Justice Thomas, a member of the Lopez/Morrison
majority who does support a return to the early modem Commerce Clause
doctrine, wrote alone in both cases.33
The core of the dissenters' objection to the Lopez/Morrisonreorientation
of Commerce Clause doctrine is the use of any categorical analysis. The
dissenters insist on the pure functionalism of the post-New Deal precedent, in
effect, equating any introduction of a categorical element with a full swing
back to the early modem era.3 38 Instead, while the ultimate implications of
Lopez/Morrison, as always, must await future decisionmaking, the decisions,
as they stand now, reflect the federalist middle course of blending formal and
functional ingredients in an effort to maintain a balanced federalism.
The Lopez/Morrison understanding of "commerce" is much closer to
Gibbons than to Knight.339 The error of Knight was not the limitation of the
commerce power to commercial regulation, but rather the artificial narrowness
of the Court's definition of commerce. Any power to regulate interstate
commerce that excludes authority over manuficturing, agriculture, mining and
other forms of production is dysfunctional at the outset. The Knight Court
ignored the Gibbons injunction that the Commerce Clause must enable Congress to erect a fully functional "system for regulating" interstate and international commerce.3 The early modern justices, in short violated the federalist
instruction to interpret congressional power according to the "common-sense"
meaning of the constitutional text.341 There is no indication in Chief Justice

Rehnquist's analysis that he is about to spring the Knighttrap. 42

336. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, in which Justice
O'Connor joined, amplified the theme of the failure of the early modem precedent, stressing
that the "limited" holding in Lopez should not be read as a return to the formalist mind-set Id.
at 568-70 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
337. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "substantial
effects" test should not be used); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing
how Court has strayed from original understanding of commerce power, of which "substantial
effects" test was not part).
338. See, e.g.,Morrison, 120 S. Ct at 1766-68,1773-74 (SouterJ., dissenting) (discussing
how categories based on economic activity or traditional state area are not useful today); id.at
1774-77 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that categorical distinctions are not helpful in com-

merce clause analysis).
339. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (defining commerce
power as not including manufacturing process).
340. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,190 (1824); see also supranotes 117-23 and
accompanying text (discussing GibbonsCourt's functional approach to defining interstate commerce).
341. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing how Gibbons Court used
"common-sense" principles to define interstate commerce).
342. Justice Kennedy emphasized the point by noting that the Court had no intention of
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The Lopez Court has a more flexible and inclusive understanding of the
economic or commercial activity that is within Congress's commerce power.
Chief Justice Rehnquist simply looked for a connection between the congressional regulation and "commerce" or some "economic enterprise." 343 Lopez's
economic-or-commercial activity compartment is not formalistically airtight,
but true to Gibbons, it allows functional breathing space. InMorrison,while
the Chief Justice left no doubt of the centrality of this element to the Lopez
analysis,3 " he declined to register that centrality with the adoption of any
ironclad "categorical rule."345 InLopez, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
indicated that Congress could control noneconomic activity if it is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 346 In
addition, Congress can reach noncommercial activity if the statute contains a
'"jurisdictional element" that ensures, "through case-by-case inquiry, that the
[regulated activity] in question affects interstate commerce." 347 The Lopez
Court did not exhibit the Knight intention of slicing up the field of economic
regulation in order to limit the scope of congressional power to the narrowest
margin. Lopez evokes instead the Gibbons requirement that congressional
regulation pursuant to the Commerce Clause address 3subject
matter within the
4
common-sense meaning of "commercial intercourse.
The Lopez and Morrison decisions themselves demonstrate how the rebalanced approach to the Commerce Clause should function to check congressional regulatory power. In Lopez, the government sought to justify Congress's prohibition of firearm possession in and around schools by positing
two causal chains to establish the requisite effect on interstate commerce.349
"returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities
was limited by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient connection to an
interstate system." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, 3., concurring).
343.

Id. at 561.

344. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct at 1750 (discussing Lopez).
345. Id.at 1751.
346. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. On this reasoning, the Lopez Court explicitly embraced
Wickard, one ofthe most expansive of the post-New Deal precedent. Id.at 560-61; see also id.
at 573-74 (Kennedy, 3., concurring) (pointing to Wikard as example of "practical conception"
of commerce power); supra note 247 and accompanying text (noting that Jones & Laughlin
used "effect of commerce" as criterion).
347. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see alsoMorrison, 120 S.CL at 1750-51(asserting thatjurisdictional element would bring activity within commerce power).
348. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,189-90 (1824) (defining commerce as "commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches"); see also supra
notes 113-23 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbons Court's focus on common sense
meaning of commerce).
349. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (explaining two causal chains set out in government's

argument). Although Congress, when it enacted the statute, made no findings that gun posses-
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The first chain linked "possession of a firearm in a school zone" to the "substantial' costs associated with "violent crime," which ultimately are spread by

'"he mechanism of insurance" throughout the country.350 The second chain
maintained that "the presence of guns in schools" posed "a substantial threat
to the educational process by threatening the learning environment," which in
trm produces "a less productive citizemy" and ultimately causes "an adverse
effect on the Nation's economic well-being. '31 In dissent, Justice Breyer
made a persuasive empirical case for the reasonableness of these claims. 2
Yet, as Chief Justice Rebnquist emphasized, similar causal chains could be
constructed to link virtually any activity to interstate commerce.35 3 The Lopez
Court simply refused to allow Congress to construct
such a chain unless the
34
first link was an economic or commercial activity.
In Morrison, the government attempted a similar causal chain to link
gender-motivated violence against women with interstate commerce. 55 Congress found that such acts of violence deterred the interstate travel of women
who were potential victims of that activity.5 . Gender-motivated violence
also, according to Congress's findings, restricted potential victims' employment and business transactions in interstate commerce and drove up their
medical costs, thereby resulting in a decrease of national productivity. 7
Following Lopez, the MorrisonCourt noted that such a causal chain could be
built for any kind of violent crime or any other activity with effects that, at
sion in and around schools had an impact on interstate commerce, the Court did not find that
failure to be disabling. Id. at 562-63. Congress did make findings after the case had begun. See
dissenting) (stating that Congress made findings "after Lopez was proseid. at 618 (Breyer, J.,

cuted").
350. Id. at 563-64.
351.
Id. at 564.
352. See id. at 618-25 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) (discussing how chain could establish
reasonable connection between firearm possession in school zone and interstate commerce).
353. See id. at 564-66 (discussing government's arguments to link gun possession in
schools and interstate commerce). The Court explained: "To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
ofthe sort retained by the States." Id. at 567.
354. See id. at 566-68 (finding that firearm possession in school zone is not economic
activity and that Government cannot establish chain to link this activity and interstate commerce).
355. InMorrison, the Court noted that Congress had used the same "method of reasoning"
in defending the Violence Against Women Act that had failed in Lopez. See Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. at 1752-54 (noting that government's argument established chain to link gender-motivated
violence and interstate commerce).
356. See id. at 1752 (stating that gender-motivated violence discouraged women from
traveling out of state).
357. See id. (discussing how gender-motivated violence reduced national productivity).

A LESSONFROMSEPARATION-OF-POWERS!JURISPRUDENCE

1269

some point, reached interstate commerce.35 Again following Lopez, the Court
refused to allow the aggregate, rippling effects of violent acts to activate the
commerce power unless the violence itself was linked to commerce." 9
The LopezlMorrison refusal to accept causal chains that convert general
regulation into commercial regulation promises to return Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to the federalist balance of Gibbons. As Publius observed, the
plan of the Constitution, which extends the power of Congress ' t o certain
enumerated cases," necessarily "so excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority. 0 6 D Chief Justice Rehnquist, following Chief Justice Marshall,
emphasized the need to maintain congressional power within the discipline of
the enumerated powers doctrine.36' Lopez also infused federalism jurisprudence with the sense of legal limitation that had been missing since the postNew Deal settlement.362 Chief Justice Rehnquist accomplished these objec-

tives precisely as had Chief Justice Marshall, by requiring that the regulatory
subject matter be within a common-sense understanding of commercial
intercourse.3 ' Navigation rights clearly fit within such an understanding; 3"
358. See id. at 1752-53 (stating that this reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any
activity).
359. See id. at 1754 (explaining that violence must be "directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce"). InMorrison, the Court also rejected the
effort by Congress to justify the Act on the basis of Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1759; see also U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that Congress
has power to enforce this amendment through legislation). The core of the Court's ruling was
that the Act exceeded congressional enforcement power because the cause of action it created
was not limited by the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment See Morrison,
120 S. Ct. at 1754-59 (discussing applicability of Fourteenth Amendment). It is beyond the
scope of this Article to assess the soundness of the Court's ruling with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment
360. TIM FEDERALISTNO. 83, supra note 113, at 541.
361. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (explaining that government's chain of reasoning
is unacceptable if they are to adhere to principle of enumerated powers); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
566-68 (refusing to treat enumerated powers as unlimited).
362. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct at 1748 (stating that commerce power "is not without effective bounds"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (articulating how confining congressional authority to
enumerated powers will bring more certainty to analysis); supra notes 94-95 and accompanying
text (discussing legal limits as emphasized in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)). The Morrison dissenters acknowledged that their allegiance to the post-New Deal
doctrine would necessitate essentially a purely political check on Congress's commerce power.
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1770-72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that political aspect
would control concept of commerce power); id.at 1775-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting
dependence on political process as limit to commerce power).
363. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing how Court deciding Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), used common sense approach to define commerce).
364. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat) 1, 190 (1824) (stating that navigation is
part of interstate commerce).
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possession of a firearm in or around
a school, as well as gender-motivated
3 65
violence, just as clearly, did not.
Also following Chief Justice Marshall and departing from the early
modem Court, the LopezlMorrison revision still allows Congress a robust
power to address those economic or commercial matters that concern the
nation. Chief Justice Rehnquist inLopez acknowledgedthe breadth ofcongressional power within the formal category of commerce, when he offered the
following assurance: 'Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."" He also
embraced the functionalism ofthis commitment by reaffirming the place ofthe
aggregation principle in measuring the substantiality of that effect.3" On the
other hand, the Lopez/Morrison majority endorsed a balanced understanding
of Gibbons, as well as of Jones & Laughlin,when it rendered the effect limitation meaningful by reclaiming their obligationto make an independent determi-

nation of substantiality.
The Lopez and Morrison decisions revitalized the federalist balance in
the jurisprudence of federalism. They promise to secure the clarity - and
strength - of a formal threshold, while adding the flexibility of a functional
approach once that threshold has been passed. They also promise a corrective
to the tendency of the post-New Deal jurisprudence to cede a general regulatory power to Congress, by tying exercises of Commerce Clause authority to
the text of Article I and by insisting that the regulation truly be of "Commerce. . among the several States."'
In blending formal and functional methods, LopezlMorrison maintains
a doctrine which, unlike that of the early modem formalism, allows Congress
a power sufficiently "broad" to address all matters pertaining to the economic
concerns of the nation. At the same time, LopezlMorrison, unlike the postNew Deal f.nctionalism, manages to do so without enabling a power so
"sweeping" as to encourage Congress to ignore the Constitution's enumera3 69
tion, and thus limitation, of its regulatory althority.
365.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (deciding that possession of firearms is not part of

interstate commerce).
366. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. Justice Kennedy reaffirmed this intention in his concurring
opinion. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) ("Congress can regulate in the commercial
sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable
national economy.").
367. See id. at 561 (stating that statute cannot be valid "under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out ofor are connected with commercial transactions, which viewed
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce"); supra note 276 and accompanying

text (discussing congressional perspective that produced aggregation principle as consequence).
368. U.S. CoNST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
369. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (indicating that post-New Deal settlement
allowed Court to interpret commerce power more broadly).
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B. Printz/Reno
In an effort parallel to the Lopez/Morrison renewal of constitutional
limitation on the ends of Congress's commerce power, the Supreme Court has
threatened to undermine its newly balanced federalism jurisprudence by trimming the federalist understanding of Congress's discretion to select the means
to achievethose ends. This effort began, albeit somewhat ambiguously, inNew
71

Yorkv. UnitedStates,370 whichthe Court decided several years beforeLopez1
The Court crystallized the meaning of New York two years after Lopez, in
Printz v. UnitedStates. Although the Printz decision is a troubling reminder
of the early modem formalist mind set, the Court's more recent decision in
Reno v. Condon provides a hopeful counterweight.3 72 In Reno, decided just

months before Morrison, a unanimous Court signaled somewhat of a retreat
from the broadest, most destabilizing implications ofthe Printz retrenchment.

In Printz,the Court, with the same five/four split as in LopezlMorrison,
invalidated provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of
1993, 3 which required local law-enforcement officials to make a "reasonable
37 5
effort"374 to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.

This statutory obligation was to remain in force only for the several years
required to create a national system capable of performing that function.3 76
The outcome of Printz is striking. The activity Congress regulated - the
sale of handguns - is clearly commercial in nature. Moreover, there can be

no serious question concerning the interstate, indeed international, dimension
ofthe market for these products. Thus, under LopezlMorrison,the Brady Act
fits squarely within the commerce power of Congress. 377 Nevertheless, the
Court held that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority by "com505 U.S. 144 (1992)..
370.
371.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144(1992). For a discussion ofNew York, see
infra notes 427-34 and accompanying text (discussing how New York Court was "troubled by
Congress's insinuation into the legislative, policymaking process ofthe states").
372. See generally Reno v. Condon, - U.S.._, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (retreating from
approach in Printz).
373.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
374. Id. § 922(sX2).
375. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997) (concluding that Congress may
not direct or command state officers in implementation of federal program).
376. For the Court's description ofthe statutory details, see Printz,521 U.S. at 902-04 (discussing regulatory scheme in Brady Act). For commentary on Printz, see generally Evan HR
Caminker, Printz. State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism,1997 SuP. CT. REV. 199;
RoderickM. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomyofFederalism: WhyStateAutonomyMakesSense
and 'DualSovereignty"Doesn't, 96 Micm L. Rzv. 813 (1998); Vicki C. JacksonFederalism
andthe Uses andLinitsofLaw: PrintzandPrinciple?,111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998).
377. See Prints, 521 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, I., dissenting) (stating that Congress clearly can
exercise commerce power over sale of handguns).
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pelling state officers to execute federal laws." 378 In doing so, the justices
ignored federalist principle and thereby threatened to upend the balance of
federalism.
In the federalist framework, the Constitution's federalism-based limits
on congressional power reside primarily in the "ends" or "objects" of national
authority, not in the "means" to achieve those objectives. 3 9 As Publius
explained, in our "compound" republic, "the essential point" is to "discriminate the objects, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different
provinces or departments of power, 3 80 while "allowing to each [such province
or department] the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed
to its charge." 8 1 In his account, Publius cautioned, "it is both unwise and
dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined
authority, as to all
3
those objects which are intrusted to its management. 1
Following in that federalist spirit, the Marshall Court limited Congress's
jurisdiction
to the enumerated powers but acknowledged its authority to be
"plenary"38 3 and "supreme"38 within those powers. The foundational jurisprudence of the Marshall Court thus allowed Congress "complete 385 discretion to
select the means itthinks best suited to effectuate its powers, so long as they are
"necessary" - that is, "plainly adapted" to those powers - and "proper" - that
is, consistent "withthe letter and spirit ofthe constitution. ' 386 Such choices, for
the most part, are matters of policy, not questions of law.387 Because, as the
378. Id. at 905; see also id. at 935 (holding that "Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition [against compelling state officers to enforce federal laws] by conscripting the states'
officers directly").
379. See supra notes 90-102, 160-68, and accompanying text (discussing how McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), achieved "balanced federalism").
380. THE FEDMLIST NO. 23, supra note 79, at 144 (emphasis omitted).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 145.
383. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,197 (1824).
384. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,405 (1819).
385. Gibbons,22 U.S. at 196.
386. Id. at 196-97 (defining commerce power); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421-23 (discussing
extent of necessary and proper power); see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper"Scope ofFederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause,43
DUKE LJ. 267, 275-76 (1993) (arguing that "necessary" and "proper" signal two separate
requirements for the constitutionality of acts of Congress implementing one of the enumerated
powers). Although Professor Lawson and Ms. Granger suggested a detailed interpretation of
the constitutional meaning of "proper," id. at 291-297, 1 am more comfortable, at least in this
Article, remaining with Chief Justice Marshall's shorthand description that congressional
statutes must "consist with the letter and spirit ofthe constitution." McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
387. See Gibbons,22 U.S. at 196-97 (asserting that restraints on commerce power vest in
"the people"); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421-23 (stating that Congress should have "discretion,"
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Printz Court candidly acknowledged, there is "no constitutional text" that
prohibited the means of enforcement Congress selected in the Brady At, 38 the
default position of congressional discretion, in the federalist scheme, should
remain intact, unless the Act violated the "spirit" ofthe Constitution.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, invoked the spirit of state sovereignty to invalidate the Act. 9 While some spirit of sovereignty both with
respect to the national and state governments undoubtedly resides in Amer-

ican constitutionalism, it is difficult to sustain a state-sovereignty principle
sufficiently sturdy to justify the Printz ruling. As a general matter, one

must be cautious with usage of the term "sovereignty" in the American constitutional tradition. "Sovereignty" classically refers to the absolute, ultimate

power in a political community. 3' ° As a matter of principle, American con-

stitutionalism locates sovereignty in the people of the United States, not
in any governmental institution.391 When Publius used the term "sovereignty," as he did often, he used it to mean "supremacy" in the relative sense
of governmental jurisdiction, not in the classical sense of ultimate power-

holder.3" In this light, it is not surprising that the Constitution, unlike the
it replaced, contains no textual mention of state
Articles of Confederation
93
"sovereignty.0
As Chief Justice Marshall reminded the state sovereignty advocates of
his day, the sovereign status of the states "underwent a change" with adoption

which "will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people").
388. Printz,521 U.S. at 905.
389. See id. at 918-22 (asserting that "dual sovereignty" principle reserved sphere of
authority for states).
390. See SCOTr-ORDONCONTROUINGTHESTATE: CONSTITUTONAUSMFROMANCIENT
ATHENS TO TODAY 19-28 (1999) (describing classical doctrine of sovereignty); Michael P.
Zuckert, A System Without Precedent Federalism in the American Constitution, in THE
FRAmING AND RATIICATION OF THE CONSTITuTON 132,134 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis 3.
Mahoney eds., 1987) (discussing attributes of doctrine of sovereignty).
391. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (articulating basis of sovereignty in
constitutional system). Professor Onuf has explained that the American commitment to popular
sovereignty has always limited the conception of any sovereignty that might reside in the states.
See ONEF, supra note 147, at 22, 31.
392. See Diamond, supra note 29, at 22 (stating way in which sovereignty was defined in
context).
393. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YAM L.J. 1425, 1456
(1987) (identifying absence of word "sovereignty" in Constitution). This silence is in marked
contrast to the Articles of Confederation, which provided that "[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence .... " THE ARTIcrEs OF CONFEDERATION art I1 see also
MERM JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDEMATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF TBE SOCIALCONSTrtruTONAL HISTORY OF THE AMmCAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 161-76 (1948)
(detailing historical problems associated with notion of sovereignty).
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ofthe Constitution.394 Publius needed no such reminder. He understood that
the creation of a national government, with its own sovereignty, inherently
diminished the pre-existing dominance and independence of the states. 9
Publius made clear that state sovereignty under the Constitution was "residual," existing only with respect to those "objects" that the framers had not
deemed appropriate to place under national control. 96 Accordingly, Chief
Justice Marshall required that arguments from state sovereignty, when deployed to challenge congressional power, be grounded on "a fair considerRhetoric that evoked a "state sovereignty,"
ation" of the Constitution."
which even during the pre-Constitutional Golden Age was "insubstantial and
illusory," simply would not do.3"
The PrintzCourt's justification for invalidating the Brady Act has only
the most tenuous connection to the Constitution, textually or spiritually. The
constitutional text contains neither a general commitment to state sovereignty
nor any particular anti-commandeering provision. While the justices' reliance
on the constitutional spirit of state sovereignty may seem more appealing, it
similarly evaporates on inspection. It is difficult to sustain the claim that the
residual sovereignty of the states is compromised intolerably in every case
where Congress, acting within its enumerated powers, has directed state and
to play some part, any part, in the administration of national
local officials
3
programs.
As Justice Scalia noted in his majority opinion, during the pre-constitutional era governed by the Articles of Confederation, Congress had relied
394. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187 (1824); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 402-05 (1819) (discussing approach to sovereignty at Constitutional Convention). Contrary to the tenor of Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz, "[b]y 1787 the
need to establish effective control over the states was generally recognized." ONUF, supra note
147, at 45.
395. See The FEDERAUSTNO. 15, at 89 (AlexanderHamilton) (ModemLibrary ed., 1941)
(discussing effect of federal government's sovereignty on states). As Peter Onuf has observed,
"[tihe debasement ofstate sovereignty was a crucial component in rethinking and reconstituting
the American union." ONUF, supranote 147, at 197-98.
396. THEFEDMEAUSTNO. 39, at249 (JamesMadison) (ModemLibrary ed, 1941). Publius
explained the federal relationship as follows: "The local or municipal authorities form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres,
to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."

Id.(emphasis added).
397.

Gibbons,22 U.S. at 187; see also id.at 187-89 (stating way in which courts should

construe Constitution).
'398. Peter S. Onuf,State Sovereignty andtheMakingofthe Constitution,in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTIUTION 78, 80 (Terence Ball & J.GA. Pocock eds., 1988).
399. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-22 (articulating notion that congressional directives to
state officials weaken state sovereignty and detailing historical context of state sovereignty).

A LESSONFROMSPARATION-OF-POWERSJURISPRUDENCE 1275
exclusively on the states for the implementation of its laws." The Articles
provided that the Congress ofthe United States, although vested with considerably less competence than would be a fully enabled legislature, nevertheless
had the authorityto issue "binding" instructions onthe states."01 Notwithstanding its provision for a "[federal commandeering of state govermnents,"' there
was no doubt that the Articles contemplated a robust sovereignty in the
states. 3 Indeed, the requirement that Congress implement national programs
through the states was appreciated as a recognition, not a betrayal, of state
sovereignty.'
It is a curious conclusion, to say the least, that the implicit,

diminished, and residual state sovereignty under the Constitution would
disallow what the explicit dominant, and primary state sovereignty under the
Articles demanded - that Congress work through the states.
The contemporary experience of the European Union echoes somewhat
that of America during the Confederation era. °5 If anything, the sovereignty
of the member states of the European Union is more meaningfully observed
than has ever been the case among the states of the American Union.' 6 Yet,
as was true during the state-dominant era of the American Confederation per-

iod, the authority ofthe European Union to issue "directives" to member states
compelling them to regulate according to specified criteria is considered consistent with the sovereignty retained by those states."
400. Id; see also Donald S. Lutz, TheArticles ofConfederation as the Background to the
FederalRepublic, 20 Publius 55,61-64 (1990) (noting role of states in implementing laws and

detailing debate of representation).
401. TBE ARTiCLES OF CONFEDERATiON art X see also id. at art XIII (stating that states
shall follow directives of Congress).
402. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
403. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (discussing development of doctrine of
sovereignty in America).
404. See MOPGAN,supra note 143, at 264 (describing nature ofcongressional action under
Articles of Confederation).
405. The European Union had its origin in the post-World War R efforts toward economic
integration in Western Europe, beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC") bythe TreatyofParis in 1951. SeeDEiCKWYATr&ALANDASHWOOD,
EUROPEAN COmmuNrry LAW 3-4 (3d ed. 1993) (detailing foundation of European Union
Movement). The current European Union is grounded in the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
signed inMaastrichtin 1992. See T.C.HARTLEBTEFOUDATIioNoFEUROPEANCOMMUNirY
LAW 6-8 (4th ed. 1998) (explaining basis for and features of current European Community).
Professor Hartley cautioned, "[i]t is not easy to compare the Community with other political
entities: it contains some features of an ordinary international organization and, less prominently
perhaps but nevertheless quite distinctly, some features of a federation." Id. at 9.
406. See HARTLEY, supra note 405, at 255-56 (observing that Parliament law in United
Kingdom ultimately prevails over European Community law). The members of the European
Union, of course, have long histories as sovereign nation-states.
407. Article 189 ofthe Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community authorizes
the Council and the Commission of the European Union to "issue directives" to a member state.
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As the regimes of the American Confederation and the European Union
demonstrate, it is incorrect, as an empirical matter, to posit that a commitment
to state sovereignty, even one far stronger than that implied in the American
Constitution, requires a conclusion that the general government may not act
throughthe states. The evidence points decidedly toward the opposite conclusion. It certainly is the case, as Justice Scalia emphasized, that the American
framers fully intended to free Congress from the Confederation's requirement
that it act only through the states.4 8 But the motivation for doing so was not to
nurture state sovereignty by limiting the power of the national government.4°
In Federalist15, the leading essay that explains and justifies the Constitution's
enabling of the national government to operate directly on the people, Publius
never once arguedthatthis shift would protect state sovereignty. Indeed, inthat
very paper, Publius candidly noted thatthe framers' decisionto
create a compe410
tent national government would undercut that sovereignty.
Federalist15 makes clear that the founders' decision to empower the
national government to act directly onthe people ofthe United States reflected
a commitment to enhance the competence of that government by removing its
dependence on the states. 411 They sought to effectuate the autonomy and

sovereignty of the national government, not of the states.412 Their decision,
WYATT & DAsHWOOD, supra note 405, at 69-70 (detailing effect of directives on member

states). Article 189 provides that directives are "binding, as to the result to be achieved," but
that the member states can choose the "form and methods" ofimplementation. HARTLEY, supra
note 405, at 199-200. Article 189 also authorizes the Council and Commission of the European
Union to "make regulations," which are "binding" rules of "general application" that are
"directly applicable" to the people "in all Member States." Id. at 99, 196. Because the European Court has found that directives, under certain conditions, can have a similar "direct effect,"
the line between directives and regulations has blurred somewhat See id. at 200-06 (clarifying
differences between directives and regulations). (Article 189 has been renumbered Article 249
by the Treaty of Amsterdama, signed in 1997.)
408. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20 (remarking that constitutional system required concurrent authority between states and federal government). Publius considered the Confederation
requirement that Congress act only on the states as the "great and radical vice" of that regime.
TBE FEDERAMI1T No. 15, supra note 395, at 89 (stating that problem of Confederation is lack
of energy given to federal government).
409. See Printz,521 U.S. at 919-22 (arguing that structure of constitutional system would

protect liberty).
410. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 395, at 89 (maintaining that weakening of
state sovereignty is necessary for workable federal government).
411. See id. at 89-95 (discussing how lessening of state sovereignty will strengthen entire
constitutional system).
412. Justice Stevens made a similar argument for the four Printz dissenters. See Printz,
521 U.S. at 945-48 (Stevens, I., dissenting) (detailing how constitutional system was designed
to empower federal government). Justice Stevens's argument tracked his opinion in New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210-13 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). I discuss New York at infra notes 427-34 and accompanying text.
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more generally and more essentially, embodied the central federalist understanding that the national government was constituted by the
"People of the
414
United States"t413 and not by the states as corporate entities.
In this light, the Printz Court stands opposed to the federalist understanding of federalism as well as to its prescription for balance. Throughout his
majority opinion, Justice Scalia stressed the need to limit the power of the
national government as if that is the only constitutional value at stake in the
case that is worthy ofjudicial notice. Nowhere in the opinion is there recognition of the complimentary requirement that the national government be fully
competent to achieve its limited constitutional mission. The justices in Prntz
accomplished what the opponents of the national bank in McCulloch had
attempted, but failed to accomplish. By a judicial slight of hand, the Printz
Court converted a decision by the fiamers to empower the government into a
limitation.4 5 an McCulloch, this decision involved the Necessary and Proper
Clause and, in Printz,the power of the national government to act directly on
the people.)
Publius certainly gave no indication that the national government's auth416
ority to act directly on the people would cause this kind of limiting effect.
Indeed, in direct contrast to the Printz position, Publius believed that the
Constitution empowered the national government to use state officials in the
administration of federal law because it authorized that government to act
directly on the people. In Federalist27, Publius explained that "by extending
the authority ofthe federal head to the individual citizens ofthe several States,
[the Constitution] will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. 4 1" He continued: "Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government asfar as its just and
constitutionalauthorityextends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws."1418 Publius invoked the same principle in Federalist 36,

when in seeking to quiet fears of Congress's taxing authority, he observed that
Congress "can make use of the system of each State within the State" in the
413. U.S. CoNsT., pmbl.
414. See McCullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,402-05 (1819) (determining that
federal government is empowered directly by people).
415. See id. at 418-21 (explaining that necessary and proper clause expands powers of
Congress).
416. See BEER, supra note 1, at 251-53 (illustrating how increased authority of federal
government affects both states and individuals); Powell, supra note 1, at 659-64 (arguing that
Publius envisioned balancing of state and federal power).
417.
TBE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,
1941).
418. Id. at 169-70.
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collection of federal taxes." 9 Publius's expectation could not have been
clearer. It followed from a central premise of the federalist balance: Al-

though the national government is limited to certain, enumerated objects of
authority, within those objects the policy dictates of the federal government
trump state prerogatives.42 °
This was the essence of the federalist understanding which the early

modem justices ignored as they carved up the common-sense meaning of

"commerce" in the interest of state autonomy. The Printzmajority made the
same mistake when it carved out, again in the interest of state autonomy, one
of Congress's policy options for the effectuation of its constitutional power.
Like the early modem Court, the Pnntz Court acted without any secure basis

in the Constitution. Instead, the justices in both instances allowed their overdrawn assessment of the demands of state sovereignty categorically to dis-

place congressional judgment.
The Pnintz majority also resembled the early modem justices in the
starkness of its formalism. One may grant, as I do, that "proper" congressional legislation must align with the "spirit" as well as the text of the Con-

stitution, and that some notion of state sovereignty resides in that spirit.
One may also grant, again as I do, that Congress's power to direct the actions
of state governments and their officials, even within the ambit of federal

authority, inherently conflicts with legitimate state interests in sovereignty.
The federalist understanding of federalism, after all, posits the "constitu-

tional necessity" of a "separate organization" of the states "for local pur419. THE FEDERAUSTNO. 36, at 219 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed, 1941).
Publius continued, "[tihe method of laying and collecting... taxes in each State can, in all its
parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government" Id. at 219-20.
Publius struck a similar note in Federalist 44, when he justified the Supremacy Clause's
requirement that state officials comply with federal law but not that federal officials follow state
law. He observed:
Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one,
which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal government will have
no agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect. The members and officers

of the State governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving
effect to the federal Constitution.

THE FEDERAIST NO. 44, supra note 28, at 297.
420. See THE FEDLERALIST No. 27, supra note 417, at 169 (stating that federal law will be
supreme and binding on states). Justice Souter grounded his dissent in Printz on Federalist27,
which he found consistent with other papers. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Federalist27 is supported by TIH FEDERAIST 36,44, and 45). Justice Stevens
interpreted the relevant FederalistPapers similarly. See id. at 946.48 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that framers intended that federal government could require states to implement
its laws). For Justice Scalia's alternative reading of The Federalistin support of the majority
position, see id. at 910-15 (determining that states must consent to responsibilities imposed by
federal government).
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poses.""42 The states, as well as the national government, have a constitutional status that must be preserved for the maintenance of balanced governance.'
The federalist appreciation of meaningful state sovereignty, for
example, is evident in the general presumption of concurrent state power with
respect to matters reachable by Congress." The federalist balance similarly
should ensure that congressional directives do not rob states of their essential
ability to govern in the areas of their residual sovereignty. This need for
balance, however, suggests the appropriateness of a functional, rather than a
formal inquiry.424 A functional consideration of congressional means that
enlist state and local officials in the service of national ends would fit the
general federalist approach to congressional power, which integrates formal
limits on regulatory ends with a functional assessment ofthe statutory means
toward those ends.4' In this setting, a truly balanced approach, one respectful of the implications of governmental sovereignty in both the national and
state governments, would avoid any categorical rule completely allowing or
disallowing Congress to direct the states to administer federal policy.
The opportunity for a more functional, and more balanced, alternative to
the Printz problem is suggested by a look at New York v. United States, a
decision on which the PrIntz Court placed its chief reliance.426 In New York,
the Court invalidated a federal statutory provision that obligated states either
to provide for the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated
421.
THE FEDERAUST No. 9, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (M(;dem Library ed., 1941).
Publius added, however, that the states would exist "inperfect subordination to the general
authority of the union...." Id.
422. See BEER, supra note 1, at 300 (outlining reasons for balance between state and
federal governments); KETCHAM, supra note 22, at 61 (noting positive aspects of federal-

ism).
423. See MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 360-61 (1819) (noting that
while states have power to tax, they cannot tax bank incorporated by United States); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 203-05 (1824) (detailing power of states to regulate health, to
quarantine, and to inspect); THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem
Library ed., 1941) (describing power of states to raise revenue). According to Publius, the
presumption of concurrent state power should be rebutted only in three situations:
[1] where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the
Union; [2] where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in
another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and [3] where it
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
Id. at 194.
424. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (summarizing functional method of constitutional interpretation).
425. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (explaining Supreme Court's approach to interpreting Commerce Clause).
426. Printz, 521 U.S. at 926-33.
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within their borders, or to take title to and possession ofthat waste."' Finding
that Congress had "commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,"1428 the Court invalidated the provision because it was "inconsistent with
the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution."4I
The Court inNew York was rightly troubled by Congress's insinuation into the
legislative, policymaking processes of the states.43 In at least some theories
of sovereignty, especially in those systems that, like ours, are governed by the
rule of law, the nature of sovereign power is closely associated with the power
to make law.43 There is, to be sure, a considerable devotion to categorical,
formalistic rhetoric in the New York opinion that may offer solace to the
Pintz Court. Yet, at bottom, New Yorkpresentedthejustices with a functionally disturbing governance problem, which they emphasized as well. By
blurring the decision making process in the state legislature, Congress had
seriously compromised the "separate organization" of the sovereign law
making processes of the states.432
The stakes for state sovereignty realistically at risk in Printz,however,
were a far cry from New York. The background checks the Brady Act assigned to local law-enforcement officials were tentative and minor.43 3 Under
the Act, as summarized by Justice Scalia, these officials were only under
an implicit obligation to accept forms submitted by firearms dealers concerning prospective purchasers. 41 Within the five-day waiting period, the
officials were not obligated to perform background checks of the purchasers to determine their legal eligibility to buy the firearm, but only to
make "reasonable efforts" to do so." That is it. The local law-enforcement
officials were not even required to block a purchase they deemed to be
427. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,174-77 (1992).
428. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
429. Id. at 177.
430. Saikrishna Prakash has argued that there is a stronger historical pedigree for the
Court's no-commandeering principle with respect to state legislative processes than with regard
to state executive and judicial offices. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1959-60 (1993) (arguing that federal government can require state
agencies to enforce federal law).
431.' See GORDON,supranote 390, at 43-46 (describing different theories of sovereignty).
432. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (discussing way in

which accountability is diminished by allowing federal government to compel states to enforce
its laws); supra note 422 and accompanying text (discussing federalist understanding of federalism).
433. See Printz,521 U.S. at 902-04 (detailing provisions of Brady Act).
434. Id. at 904.
435. Id.
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illegal."' Not only were the Brady Act intrusions minimal in any functional
sense, they also were temporary. The local law-enforcement officials were
"pressed into federal service" 437 only until the federal government could create
a national system for background checks, but in no event longer than five
years.43 During this interim period, the federal government was unable to
perform the background checks effectively.
Any functional review would have distinguished Printz from New York.
Yet, the Printz Court pointedly refused to engage in any kind of "balancing
analysis" that would require a judicial assessment of the actual intrusion on
state sovereignty, as compared with congressional need for state administration. 439 The Court preferred to tilt the balance in every case toward state
sovereignty.
It is precisely the kind of functional analysis rejected by the PrintzCourt
that is appropriate here, however. In the New YorkPrintz setting, the constitutional issue necessarily is poised in a functional dimension. There is no
constitutional text, as the Court recognized, that governs the issue of federal
use of state administration. Nor is there, as the Court would have it, any firm
constitutional "principleof separate state sovereignty"44 sufficiently specific
to resolve this issue. In these cases, the Court must balance because both
Congress and the states have a legitimate constitutional claim at stake. For
Congress, it is the right to exercise policy discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional powers. For the states, it is the right to governmental competence to pursue the objects of authority that have not been entrusted to the
nation. The question in each case, inescapably, must be whose right must
yield to the overriding interest of the other.
The Court in Pintz hardened the New York concern with respect to
congressional dictation of state legislative processes by announcing an airtight
rule against any congressional direction of any state official in the administration of any federal regulatory programs under any set of circumstances.44 1 In
436. Id.
437. Id. at 905.
438. Id. at 902.
439. Id. at 932.
440. Id.; see also supra notes 390-99 and accompanying text (explaining doctrine of sovereignty within constitutional system).
441.
The Printz Court expressed its conclusion as follows:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce
a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that
prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor

command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is
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doing so, the Court renewed an old relationship, expressing a preference for
strict formalism in enforcing the federalism limits on congressional power.
Justice Scalia explained, "an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon
state authority is not likely to be an effective one." 442 Similar to the early
modem Court, he443
required a strict formalism to maintain a strict "system of
dual sovereignty."1
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Printz majority powerfiflly evoked the
thoroughgoing formalism ofthe early modem Court. All ofthe warning signs
are present. The opinion appealed to state sovereignty as the guiding norm of
decision, with a concomitant disrespect for the policy judgment of Congress.' The Court categorically enforced limiting principles on congressional authority that lack grounding in the constitutional text and that flow
instead from a felt need to channel federal authority as the justices believe
appropriate. Finally, and most suggestively, the Court once again embraced
a formal limit on congressional authority without any functional counterweight.
The early modem echoes of Pintz,however, have been muted somewhat
by the Court's recent decision in Reno v. Condon. 5 In Reno, the justices
upheld the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, which restricted the
authority of states to disclose the personal information contained in the
records of their departments of motor vehicles.44 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the personal information, in this
setting, was "an article of commerce," 7 and that "its sale or release into the
interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulainvolved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens of benefits is necessary
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of

dual sovereignty.
Printz,521 U.S. at 935.
442.

Id. at 928.

443. Id. at 935; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text (articulating that formalist
theory of constitutional construction is necessary to maintain dual sovereignty).
444. See id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Necessary and Proper Clause
enables Congress to make policy decisions affecting state sovereignty).
445. Reno v. Condon, _ U.S.._, 120 S. Ct. 141 (2000).
446. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994). For a description of the statutory scheme, see Reno,
120 S. Ct. at 668-70 (detailing provision of Driver's Privacy Protection Act).
447. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by
insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used
in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for
matters related to interstate motoring.
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tion."44

The central issue in Reno was whether the congressional regulation
violated the 'principle
of separate state sovereignty" that the Court had form9
alized in Printz.41

The state argued that, as in New York andPrintz,the congressional regulatory scheme compromised its sovereignty.5 0 The state complained that
Congress had directed its officials to comply with a complex network of
obligations in the service of a national policy of protecting the privacy of
drivers.4"' The state, in this sense, had lost sovereign control not only over its
employees, but also over the resources necessary to comply with congressional mandates.452 The Court rejected the argument, refusing to extend the New
YorklPrintz prohibition beyond congressional statutes that "require the States
in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens."4 3
The Court's decision in Reno in no way calls into question the commitment of the Pnntz majority to maintain its categorical exclusion of congressional commandeering of state regulatory authority, but it does suggest the
justices may be content to allow Printz to rest there. If this is so, Printz ultimately might become simply a junior partner to LopezlMorrison. In Lopezl
Morrison,the Court soughtto revitalize the federalism limits on congressional
regulatory power by reintroducing a formal constraint on the enumerated ends
of that power. Printz,in its most basic, least suggestive reading, simply added
another formal limit, foreclosing a particular means that the justices regard as
especially threatening to state sovereignty. So confined, the Printz decision,
while inconsistent with the federalist understanding of federalism, should not
prove destabilizing to the overall balance of the Court's doctrinal structure.
If on the other hand, the Court, notwithstanding Reno, begins to expand
the Printz exclusion in a widening definition of an impregnable state sovereignty, it will be LopezlMorrison that will become a footnote, or rather a
prelude, to a major swing of the federalism pendulum back toward the heady
formalism of the early modem era. In this event, the balance of Lopez/Morrison would be seen as a momentary pause as the Court finally halted its postNew Deal functional swing and prepared for a return in the formalist direction. For those who favor a balanced approach to federalism, as did the federalist leaders of the founding generation, such a retreat could only be considered a lost opportunity.
448. Id.
449. Printz,421 U.S. at 532.
450. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 670-71 (expressing South Carolina's claim that regulatory
scheme violated Tenth Amendment).
451.
See ia at 671-72 (outlining responsibilities of state officers underAct).

452.

See id. (noting resources states must use to comply with Act).

453.

Id. at 672.
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Conclusion
Federalism jurisprudence is, again, at a cross roads. In its rethinking of
the federalism limits on the regulatory power of Congress, the contemporary
Court has cleared two paths. One path, identified in Lopez/Morrison, promises a balanced jurisprudence in line with the federalist tradition and the
foundational era of constitutionaijurisprudence. The other, opened in Printz,
threatens a return to the dysfunctional formalism that plagued the early
modern era. InLopezlMorrison,the justices were acutely aware of the value,
and the limits, of formalism in any healthy understanding of congressional
authority. InPrintz,they seemed to have forgotten their own warnings against
a full-fledged embrace of formalism. One hopes the meaning of Reno is that
they have remembered.
The justices will continue to settle the ultimate meaning of Lopez/Morrison and PrintzlReno, as well as the direction of federalism jurisprudence, in
future decisions. When doing so, the justices should keep in mind their experience with respect to the other central feature of the constitutional structure that governing the separation of powers. The Court's perpetual cycling between formal and functional methodologies has left separation-of-powers
methodology in considerable disarray. While Lopez promised to break that
cycle in federalism doctrine, Printz threatened to propel it. A judicial settlementalongthepath ofLopez/Morrisonbalance, witha corresponding abandonment ofPrintzformalism, not only would create a healthy federalism, but also
may spur a long overdue rethinking of separation-of-powers jurisprudence.
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